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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As the Internet becomes more important to our everyday lives, commentators debate over the
best policies and models to drive even more widespread adoption and deployment of broadband
technologies. Some claim the European model of service-based competition, induced by stiff
telephone-style regulation, outperforms the facilities-based competition practiced in the U.S. in
promoting broadband. Data analyzed for this report reveals, however, that the U.S. led in many
broadband metrics in 2011 and 2012. 
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• High-Speed Access: A far greater percentage of
U.S. households had access to Next Generation
Networks (NGA) (25 Mbps) than in Europe. This was
true whether one considered coverage for the entire
nation (82% vs. 54%) or restricted the analysis to
rural areas (48% vs. 12%), suggesting that the U.S.
approach proved more effective than the European
approach at narrowing the digital divide. 
• Fiber and LTE Deployment: Turning to specific tech-
nologies, the data indicate that the U.S. had better
coverage for fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) (23% vs.
12%) and for the fourth- generation wireless technol-
ogy known as Long-Term Evolution (4G LTE) (86% vs.
27%). Furthermore, empirical analysis undercuts
claims that the provision of high-speed Internet
depended exclusively on fiber. In short, FTTP
remained a minor contributor to NGA coverage, and
those countries that emphasized fiber were the bot-
tom broadband performers among the eight
European countries studied. 
• Regulatory Policies and Competition Models:
Disparities between European and U.S. broadband
networks stemmed from differing regulatory
approaches. Europe has relied on regulations that
treat broadband as a public utility and focus on pro-
moting service-based competition, in which new
entrants lease incumbents’ facilities at wholesale
cost (also known as unbundling). The U.S. has gen-
erally left buildout, maintenance, and modernization
of Internet infrastructure to private companies and
focused on promoting facilities-based competition,
in which new entrants are expected to construct
their own networks. Regression analysis indicates
that the U.S. approach has proven more effective in
promoting NGA coverage than the European
approach.
• Investment: The difference in regulation and com-
petition models influenced the amount of broadband
investment in the U.S. and Europe. In Europe, where
it was cheaper to buy wholesale services from an
incumbent provider, there was little incentive to
invest in new technology or networks. In the U.S.,
however, providers had to build their own networks
in order to bring broadband services to customers.
Data analysis indicates that as of the end of 2012,
the U.S. approach promoted broadband investment,
while the European approach had the opposite
effect ($562 of broadband investment per house-
hold in the U.S. vs. $244 per household in Europe).
• Download Speeds: U.S. download speeds during
peak times (weekday evenings) averaged 15 Mbps,
which was below the European average of 19 Mbps.
There was also a disparity between the speeds
advertised and delivered by broadband providers in
the U.S. and Europe. During peak hours, U.S. actual
download speeds were 96% of what was advertised,
compared to Europe where consumers received only
74% of advertised download speeds. The U.S. also
fared better in terms of latency and packet loss. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Data analysis indicates that the 
U.S. approach promoted broadband
investment, while the European
approach had the opposite effect.
• Price: The European pricing study reveals that U.S.
broadband was cheaper than European broadband
for all speed tiers below 12 Mbps. U.S. broadband
was more expensive for higher speed tiers,
although the higher cost was justified in no small
part by the fact that U.S. Internet users on average
consumed 50% more bandwidth than their
European counterparts.
Data analyzed for the study resolves the question
whether the U.S. is running behind Europe in the
broadband race or vice versa. The answer is clear
and definitive:  As of 2012, the U.S. was far ahead of
Europe in terms of the availability of NGA. The U.S.
advantage was even starker in terms of rural NGA
coverage and with respect to key technologies such
as FTTP and LTE. The empirical evidence thus con-
firms that the United States is faring better than
Europe in the broadband race and provides a strong
endorsement of the regulatory approach taken so far
by the U.S. It also suggests that broadband coverage
is best promoted by a balanced approach that does
not focus exclusively on any one technology.
Case studies of eight European countries (Denmark,
France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden,
and the United Kingdom) confirm that facilities-based
competition has served as the primary driver of invest-
ments in upgrading broadband networks. Moreover, the
countries that emphasized FTTP had the lowest NGA
coverage rates in this study and ranked among the low-
est NGA coverage rates in the European Union. In fact,
two countries often mentioned as leaders in broadband
deployment (Sweden and France) end up being rather
disappointing both in terms of national NGA coverage
and rural NGA coverage.
iiCoverage in the U.S. and Europe, 2012
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Comparison between U.S., EU and Case Study Countries, 2012
Total Rural Investment Bandwidth Percentage
NGA NGA per HH per User Rural HHs
U.S. 82% 48% $562 27 19%
Europe 54% 12% $244 18 15%
Sweden 57% 6% $280 n/a 17%
France 24% 1% $326 12 18%
Italy 14% 0% $291 12 13%
Denmark 73% 3% $457 n/a 17%
Spain 64% 13% $255 13 18%
Netherlands 98% 85% $450 n/a 8%
UK 70% 18% $215 31 9%
Germany 66% 26% $197 14 11%
iv
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Survey after survey shows U.S. broadband
quality, speed and adoption rates falling
dangerously behind that of countries in
Asia and Europe.
— Free Press
[W]hile digital technology and content
has improved, and countries around the
world, from the US to Asia, are starting to
reap the benefits out of it, Europe is
falling behind.
— Neelie Kroes (2013b)
“
“
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1. INTRODUCTION
Articles periodically appear in the U.S. media raising
the concern that the U.S. is falling behind Europe in the
broadband race. These stories typically characterize
U.S. high-speed broadband as widely unavailable,
expensive, and slow. The proposed solution is to
reform U.S. broadband policy so that it is more like
Europe’s (see, e.g., New York Times 2013, 2014b; NPR
2014; USA Today 2014). 
Media reports and speeches by policymakers on the
other side of the Atlantic tell a very different story. The
concern there is that Europe is falling behind the
United States and that the low levels of investment in
broadband infrastructure indicate that Europe should
consider adopting a more U.S.-style regulatory
approach (see, e.g., Kroes 2012a, 2012b, 2013a,
2013b, 2013c; Süddeutsche Zeitung 2013 (quoting
Angela Merkel)). 
The contradictory nature of these statements invites a
closer examination of the true state of affairs with
respect to broadband in different parts of the world
(although this study focuses on Europe and defers con-
sideration of Asian broadband until another study
planned for later this year). The most frequently cited
basis for comparison is the data about broadband sub-
scriptions collected by the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (2013). However, these
data are problematic for several well-recognized rea-
sons. First, the OECD defines broadband as any
service capable of delivering 256 kbps. As a result, the
data provide information about a service tier that is
generally regarded as obsolete. Second, broadband
subscribership represents a rather murky indicator of
broadband availability and investment. Studies have
consistently shown that the primary reasons that peo-
ple do not subscribe to broadband are a lack of
interest, lack of a computer, difficulties in using the
Internet, lack of computer skills, and age rather than
nonavailability or high prices (EC 2013b, 13; Ofcom
2013a, 368; Pew Research Center Internet Project
2013).
Broadband penetration levels thus reflect a broad
range of considerations unrelated to coverage and
infrastructure investment. What is needed is a direct
measure of broadband availability. Although the OECD
tracks this information, the data currently available are
rather old, having not been updated since 2009, and
again track the obsolete 256 kbps standard.
Fortunately, both the European Commission (EC) and
the U.S. government have recently commissioned stud-
ies providing detailed information about the extent of
broadband coverage as of the end of 2011 and 2012
(NTIA and FCC 2012a, 2013a; EC 2012a, 2013a).
These studies report coverage levels for a wide range
of speed tiers and technologies in both urban and rural
areas. The European mapping study focuses on Next
Generation Access (NGA), which it defines to be service
providing download speeds of at least 30 Mbps, a
close analysis reveals that the study actually reports
data for 25 Mbps service (EC 2013a, 6).
These data reveal that concerns that the U.S. is losing
the broadband race are misplaced. As an initial matter,
a far greater percentage of U.S. households have
access to NGA than in Europe. Interestingly, this is true
whether one considers coverage for the entire nation or
one restricts the analysis only to rural areas, suggest-
ing that the U.S. approach is more effective than the
European approach at narrowing the digital divide.
Turning to specific technologies, the data also indicate
that the U.S. also has better coverage for cutting-edge
technologies, including fiber-to-the-premises (FTTP) and
for the fourth-generation wireless technology known as
Long-Term Evolution (4G LTE). 
The mapping data also provide insight into the long-
standing debate between the regulatory philosophies
underlying U.S. and European broadband policy.
European broadband policy has focused on promoting
service-based competition, in which new entrants lease
the incumbents’ facilities at wholesale cost, while U.S.
broadband policy has focused on promoting facilities-
based competition, in which new entrants are expected
to construct their own networks. The mapping data are
sufficiently detailed to permit regression analysis to
determine which approach is better at promoting high-
speed broadband coverage. The regressions indicate
that the U.S. approach is promoting broadband invest-
ment, while the European approach is having the
opposite effect. More specifically, service-based com-
These data reveal that concerns that the
U.S. is losing the broadband rates are
misplaced.  … [A] far greater percent-
age of U.S. households have access to
NGA than in Europe.
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petition has a statistically significant negative impact
on NGA coverage, while facilities-based competition
has a statistically significant positive effect on NGA
coverage. The fact that these regressions yield such
strong results despite being based on a relatively small
number of observations attests to the strength of
these conclusions.
These results have clear implications for public policy.
For example, they shed light in to how Europe can meet
its Digital Agenda goal of 100% NGA coverage by 2020.
In addition, as noted above, European policymakers
have begun an active debate over whether they should
shift their emphasis away from their traditional focus
on promoting service-based competition in favor of an
approach focused on increasing incentives to invest in
infrastructure. In the U.S., comparisons with the
European experience are sometimes invoked as sup-
port for proposals to reclassify the Internet to bring it
within the regime of common carriage or public utility
regulation that has governed traditional telephone serv-
ice (FCC 2014). The experience under the different
approaches to regulation will also provide insights into
how to manage the IP transition as well as how best to
update the U.S. communications statutes.
These mapping studies have been supplemented by
other studies conducted or commissioned by the EC or
the FCC that examine other key information, such as
broadband investment, pricing, and download speeds
(EC 2012b, 2013d, 2014c, FCC 2012b). The European
pricing study reveals that U.S. broadband is cheaper in
the U.S. than European broadband for all speed tiers
up to 12 Mbps. U.S. broadband is more expensive for
higher speed tiers, although the higher cost is justified
in no small part by the fact that the average U.S.
household consumes 57% more bandwidth than its
European counterpart.
The study supplements the European-level analysis
with case studies of eight leading European countries.
These studies reveal that three countries that did not
face vigorous competition from cable and emphasized
FTTP over DSL (Sweden, France, and Italy) achieved the
lowest NGA coverage rates in this study, ranking near
the very bottom of the EU, and were particularly weak
in rural NGA coverage. The only country of these coun-
tries to achieve significant fiber penetration (Sweden)
did so through government subsidies that led to public
ownership of 40% to 50% of the fiber. Sweden still
ranked only 20th of 28 EU states. The five countries
with effective competition from cable all exceeded EU
NGA coverage levels. Among the two countries that
emphasized FTTP over DSL, Denmark’s FTTP initiative
(driven largely by energy companies) has stalled, while
Spain’s is increasing its deployments. Among countries
emphasizing VDSL, FTTP coverage remains surprisingly
modest in the Netherlands, notwithstanding the well-
publicized fiber initiatives associated with Reggefiber
and CIF. Germany and the UK have achieved
respectable NGA coverage despite focusing on VDSL
almost to the total exclusion of FTTP.  These outcomes
suggest that policymakers should not focus too nar-
rowly on any one technology.   Instead, they should take
a flexible approach that takes into account existing
deployments and the different economics underlying
each technology. 
The European pricing study reveals that
U.S. broadband is cheaper in the U.S.
than European broadband for all speed
tiers up to 12 Mbps.
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2. THE EUROPEAN AND U.S. 
MAPPING STUDIES
2.1 Next Generation Access (NGA) 
Coverage
As noted above, for purposes of measuring broadband
investment, coverage is the better way to measure out-
comes than subscriptions. Fortunately, both the EC and
the U.S. government have recently commissioned map-
ping studies that have generated high-quality data
regarding broadband availability as of the end of 2011
and 2012. The European study encompasses the
member states of the EU as well as Iceland, Norway,
and Switzerland, although it reports data for the EU as
well as for all of the study countries. The U.S. study
reports both nationwide and state-level measures. Both
studies also report broadband coverage for rural areas
and break out each of these measures by all of the
leading broadband technologies. 
One major difference between the studies is the speed
tiers analyzed. The U.S. study reports results for a wide
variety of download speeds, including 768 kbps, 1.5
Mbps, 3 Mbps, 6 Mbps, 10 Mbps, 25 Mbps, 50 Mbps,
and 100 Mbps. The European study reports results for
only two speed tiers. The first is standard broadband,
which the study defines as service providing download
speeds of at least 144 kbps. The second is what the
European Commission calls Next Generation Access
(NGA). Although the EC’s Digital Agenda defines NGA
as 30 Mbps service, the mapping study defines NGA to
include three technologies:  VDSL, cable broadband
provided through DOCSIS 3, and fiber-to-the-premises
(FTTP), which includes both fiber-to-the-home (FTTH)
and fiber-to-the-basement (FTTB). VDSL was in turn
defined to include services capable of supporting
download speeds of at least 25 Mbps (EC 2013a, 6).
Although the European VDSL data is supposed to
include only services capable of delivering download
speeds of 25 Mbps, two countries (Belgium and the
UK) included all VDSL services without limiting to those
that met that threshold. Moreover, the European study
could also not confirm whether the data reported by six
other countries (Austria, Poland, the Czech Republic,
Greece, Italy, and Hungary) included only VDSL services
that delivered 25 Mbps. As a result, the European data
may overstate VDSL coverage slightly. The data for NGA
coverage reported in the European mapping study is
thus better regarded as representing coverage for 25
Mbps service, which matches up nicely with the data
on 25 Mbps service provided in the U.S. study.
In addition, the U.S. mapping study was implemented
by contracting separately with agencies in each state.
Variations may thus exist in the way the U.S. data were
collected. For example, the U.S. mapping data reports
that VDSL provides 25 Mbps service to only 9.5% of
U.S. households as of the end of 2012 even though
AT&T reports providing its U-verse service to 24.5 mil-
lion or 18% of U.S. households as of that date (AT&T
2012). Indeed, Ofcom places U.S. VDSL 30 Mbps cov-
erage at 21% as of 2012 (Ofcom 2013b, 42). Despite
such discrepancies, this study relies on the U.S. map-
ping data as reported to ensure consistency. Since that
time, VDSL in the U.S. has continued to expand. In
November 2012, AT&T announced its Project VIP, which
included $6 billion to extend its VDSL coverage from
24.5 million to 33 million homes, while deploying a
technology known as IP DSLAMs to improve DSL serv-
ice to an additional 24 million homes by the end of
2015. Together these technologies will provide 45–75
Mbps to 57 million homes. 
Any comparisons based on the mapping studies must
thus be made in terms of the tiers included in the
European mapping study:  standard broadband and
NGA/25 Mbps. As it turns out, U.S. and European cov-
erage for standard broadband are almost identical.
Standard coverage is available in 99.5% of U.S. house-
holds and 99.4% of European households. Standard
fixed coverage is available in 95.8% of U.S. households
and 95.5% of European households. The fact that the
European data reflect lower download speeds (144
kbps) than the U.S. data (768 kbps) indicates that if
anything, these data understate the slight advantage
enjoyed by the U.S. 
Rural standard broadband coverage (98.4% for the
U.S. vs. 96.1% for Europe) and rural standard fixed
broadband (82.1% for the U.S. vs. 86.3% for Europe)
are also quite similar, although as noted earlier the
U.S. data reflect higher download speeds than the
European data. Mobile broadband coverage at 3G
speeds also fall within quite similar ranges, covering
98.5% of U.S. households and 96.3% of European
A comparison of the top-line statistics
reveals the U.S. is far ahead of Europe
in terms of total NGA coverage.
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households. The U.S. does enjoy an advantage with
respect to rural 3G mobile broadband (94.9% for the
U.S. vs. 82.1% for Europe).
The data for 25 Mbps service reveal more significant
differences. A comparison of the top-line statistics
reveals the U.S. is far ahead of Europe in terms of total
NGA coverage. Specifically, NGA service was available
in 73% of U.S. households as of the end of 2011 and
in 82% of U.S. households as of the end of 2012. By
contrast, NGA service was available in only 48% of
European households by the end of 2011 and in 54%
of European households by the end of 2012.
A paired t-test indicates that the difference between
U.S. and European NGA coverage is statistically signifi-
cant at the 98% confidence level. Moreover, the U.S.
advantage increased over time: In 2011, the difference
between the U.S. and Europe NGA coverage was 25
percentage points, whereas by 2012 the difference had
increased to 28 percentage points. Given the high lev-
els of U.S. NGA penetration, it is unlikely that the U.S.
will be able to maintain this lead with respect to 25
Mbps service in the future, although the gap may per-
sist at higher speed tiers. That said, it is clear that the
U.S. enjoyed substantially greater national coverage of
25 Mbps service in 2011 and 2012.
2.2 Rural NGA Coverage
In addition to national data, both the U.S. and
European studies include data for NGA coverage in
rural areas. The U.S. and the European study applied
slightly different definitions of rural areas. The
European study viewed an area as rural if the popula-
tion density was less than 100 people per square
kilometer. The U.S. study viewed an area as rural if the
population density was less than 500 people per
square mile, which is the equivalent of 193 people per
square kilometer. The U.S. definition includes areas
that have slightly higher population density and thus is
more forgiving.
FIGURE 1:  
NGA Coverage (25 Mbps) in the U.S. and Europe, 2011 and 2012
Sources:  EC (2013a); NTIA and FCC (2012a, 2013a).
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In addition, the European mapping study identifies rural
areas based on the European Kilometre Grid (EKG),
which divides countries into squares one kilometer
across and provides population density and basic land-
use data for each square. The U.S. mapping study
identifies rural areas in terms of census blocks (U.S.
Census Bureau 1994). 
With respect to rural NGA coverage, the gap between
the U.S. and Europe was even wider than for total NGA
coverage. As of the end of 2011, NGA service was
available in 38% of U.S. rural households and 9% of
European rural households. By the end of 2012, NGA
service increased to 48% of U.S. rural households and
12% of European rural households. Given the wide dis-
parity in these numbers, it is unlikely that it can be
explained by the difference in definitions of what consti-
tutes a rural area. 
A paired t-test indicates that this difference is statisti-
cally significant at the 96% confidence level. Moreover,
the U.S. advantage increased over time:  In 2011, the
FIGURE 2:  
Rural NGA Coverage (25 Mbps) in the U.S. and Europe, 2011 and 2012
Sources:  EC (2013a); NTIA and FCC (2012b, 2013b).
difference between the U.S. and Europe was 29 per-
centage points, whereas in 2012, the difference
increased to 36 percentage points. As noted above,
the fact that the U.S. study is based on a more gener-
ous definition of rural than the European study means
that the actual difference is likely to be somewhat
smaller, but it is unlikely that variation in methodology
can explain all of the difference.
If the U.S. had been included in the European study, it
would have ranked sixth in both NGA coverage and
rural NGA coverage, behind only five countries. These
countries are listed in Table 1, along with some addi-
tional information. 
The rural household numbers are from the European
mapping study. Population density and GDP per capita
(adjusted for purchasing power parity) are from
Eurostat, with GDP per capita indexed so that the EU
average equals 100. Prices for 12–30 Mbps service
are the median prices reported in the European study
of broadband pricing as of February 2012 (EC 2012b).
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6 TABLE 1:  
Comparison of Countries with the Highest Total NGA Coverage, Rural NGA Coverage, 2012
Total Rural Pct. Pop. GDP Price Avg.
NGA NGA Rural Density per 12–30 speed
Rank Rank HHs (pop./km2) capita Mbps Mbps
Malta 1 1 1% 1327 86 42 € n/a
Netherlands 2 3 8% 497 128 30 € 8.6
Belgium 3 4 5% 367 120 34 € 6.7
Switzerland 4 5 15% 200 158 43 € 8.7
Luxembourg 5 2 13% 205 263 46 € 4.7
U.S. 6 6 19% 34 152 36 € 7.4
Sources:  EC (2012b, 2013a); Eurostat (2014a, 2014c); NTIA and FCC (2013a, 2013b); Akamai (2013).
Average download speed is from Akamai, which, in light
of the fact that SamKnows did not report download
speeds for individual countries, represents the best
source of country-level data on download speeds
(Bauer, Clark, and Lehr 2011).
The countries that achieved higher NGA coverage than
the U.S. are significantly more urban and compact than
the U.S. In fact, the top three countries are the most
urban countries in the European mapping study (Malta,
Belgium, Netherlands), and the other two countries are
in the top eleven in terms of urbanization and two of
the top three countries in Europe in in terms of per
capita GDP (Luxembourg, Switzerland). Furthermore,
with the exception of Malta, all of the top NGA coun-
tries have per capita GDPs that far exceed the
European average. In Malta, Switzerland, and
Luxembourg, the price of 25 Mbps service is substan-
tially higher than in the U.S., and in Luxembourg, the
average download speed is substantially lower.
The U.S. would have thus stood close to the top of the
list if it had been included in the European study of
NGA coverage. The fact that the U.S. compares favor-
TABLE 2:  
Percentage of Households covered by NGA, FTTP, DOCSIS 3, and VDSL and Rank for the
Top Five NGA Countries, 2012
NGA Rank FTTP Rank DOCSIS 3 Rank VDSL Rank
Malta 99.9% 1 1% 27 99.9% 1 75% 3
Netherlands 98% 2 18% 16 98% 2 60% 4
Belgium 97% 3 0.3% 30 96% 3 85% 2
Switzerland 94% 4 17% 17 93% 4 53% 5
Luxembourg 94% 5 32% 12 61% 6 88% 1
Source:  EC (2013a).
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7FIGURE 3:  
FTTP Coverage in the U.S. and Europe, 2011 and 2012
Sources:  EC (2013a); NTIA and FCC (2012a, 2013a).
ably with countries that are much more urban and with
significantly higher GDPs per capita is actually quite
remarkable. 
2.3 Fiber-to-the-Premises (FTTP)
The mapping studies also provide insights into which
technologies make the largest contribution to NGA cov-
erage. Although many advocates regard FTTP as the
primary platform for NGA, the data suggest otherwise.
In Europe, DOCSIS 3 (39% as of 2012) and VDSL
(25%) both contribute more to NGA coverage than does
FTTP (12%). In terms of actual NGA subscriptions, the
distribution skews even more heavily towards DOCSIS
3, with 57% of subscribers, followed by FTTP at 26%,
and VDSL at 15% (EC 2013, 43, 52).
An analysis of the countries with the broadest NGA cov-
erage reveals a similar pattern. Five European
countries enjoyed NGA coverage that exceeded the
U.S. level of 82%. Interestingly, FTTP did not play a
major role in any of these countries. In fact, two of
them ranked near the bottom of FTTP coverage, and
the other three fell somewhere in the middle of the
pack. In contrast, all five of these countries ranked at
the top for both DOCSIS 3.0 and VDSL coverage. The
2012 data thus do not support the critical role that
many commentators assign to FTTP.
Even if one were to focus exclusively on FTTP coverage,
the data clearly give the edge to the U.S. As of the end
of 2011, FTTP service was available in 17% of U.S.
households and 10% of European households. By the
end of 2012, FTTP service increased to 23% of U.S.
households and 12% of European households. 
A paired t-test indicates that this difference is statisti-
cally significant at the 94% confidence level. If the U.S.
were included in the European study, it would rank
12th, behind a number of Scandinavian countries,
Eastern Europe countries, Luxembourg, and Portugal.
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8 FIGURE 4:  
LTE Coverage in the U.S. and Europe, 2011 and 2012
Sources:  EC (2013a); FCC (2013a).
2.4 LTE
The European study also collected data on LTE cover-
age as of the end of 2011 and 2012. The U.S. study
did not collect LTE coverage data. However, LTE cover-
age data is available from the FCC’s most recent
Wireless Competition Report (2013a), which reported
LTE coverage by population (instead of household) as
of January 2012 and October 2012. Although these
dates and measures do not correspond precisely with
the data in the European mapping study, they are close
enough to permit a useful comparison to the year-end
2011 and 2012 numbers reported for Europe.
With respect to LTE coverage, the data confirm the con-
ventional wisdom that the U.S. is far ahead of Europe.
As of the end of 2011, LTE covered 68% of the U.S.
population and 8% of European households. By the end
of 2012, LTE coverage increased to 86% of the U.S.
population and 27% of European households. 
A paired t-test indicates that this difference is statisti-
cally significant at the 99.8% confidence level. If the
U.S. had been included in the European study, it would
have ranked third in LTE coverage, trailing only Sweden
and Portugal.
Because European coverage is measured based on
households and U.S. coverage is based on population,
this comparison should be approached with some cau-
tion. The wide disparity in these numbers makes it
unlikely that this difference can be explained by the way
coverage is defined. If anything, given the rapid buildout
in the last two months of 2012, the fact that the U.S.
data reflects coverage as of October 2012 instead of
December 2012 means that if anything, the data
understate the magnitude of the difference between
U.S. and European LTE coverage rates.
*  *  *
A comparison of the U.S. and European mapping stud-
ies thus contradicts claims that the U.S. has fallen
behind Europe in the broadband race. On the contrary,
THE EUROPEAN AND U.S. MAPPING STUDIES
0%
20%
10%
40%
30%
50%
60%
80%
70%
90%
2011 2012
US
EU
68%
8%
86%
27%
9the data convincingly show that it is Europe that has
fallen behind the U.S. in terms of NGA, rural NGA, FTTP,
and LTE coverage. If the U.S. had been included in the
European study on these measures, it would have
ranked in the top six for every measure discussed
above except for FTTP, and the only countries it would
have trailed would have been compact, highly urbanized
nations with high per capita GDPs and thus have a
much easier time delivering high-speed broadband. The
only exception is with respect to FTTP, and the data sug-
gest that FTTP is the technology that contributes the
least to NGA coverage.
2.5 Regression Analysis of Facilities-Based
vs. Service-Based Competition
The European mapping studies also provide insight into
one of the central debates in broadband policy. In the
1990s, as part of the Federal Communications
Commission’s Computer Inquiries and the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, the U.S. developed
the policy of permitting competitors to share incumbent
providers’ networks through local loop unbundling and
wholesale access. The U.S. soon soured on this idea in
part because the type of competition induced by infra-
structure sharing is quite thin, with competitors being
unable to innovate with respect to services and being
limited to competing by squeezing their own margins,
and in part because sharing can create disincentives to
invest in infrastructure. As a result, the U.S. abandoned
local loop unbundling in favor of a regulatory approach
that focused on facilities-based competition.
European regulation, in contrast, has continued to
emphasize the service-based competition by requiring
carriers with significant market power to share their
facilities through mechanisms such as local loop
unbundling, shared access, and bitstream access. 
This regime was not designed only to permit competi-
tors to share those network elements that exhibited
natural monopoly characteristics and thus could not be
replicated economically. It was also intended to permit
new entrants to climb the “ladder of investment” by
gradually replacing the network elements leased from
the incumbent with their own infrastructure (Cave 2006).
These access obligations apply generally to VDSL and
FTTP services provided by incumbent telephone compa-
nies, but except for Denmark do not apply to cable
broadband services.
As the International Telecommunications Union (2001)
has recognized, the arguments for and against local
loop unbundling and wholesale access are theoretically
ambiguous. An extensive literature has emerged evalu-
ating the impact of access regulation on investments in 
traditional voice service and standard broadband 
service (see Cambini and Jiang 2009 for a survey). 
The empirical literature evaluating the impact of access
obligations on investments in NGA is somewhat
smaller and uniformly concludes that access regulation
deters investments in NGA (Wallsten and Hausladen
2009; Briglauer, Ecker and Gugler 2012; Bacache,
Bourreau and Gaudin 2013; Briglauer 2014 ). 
The European mapping study provides fresh data col-
lected that can be used to test these propositions.
Although the number of observations is qui te limited,
the dataset reflects sufficient heterogeneity to support
regression analysis of the impact of service-based and
facilities-based competition on NGA coverage. 
The primary measure for service-based competition
is the new entrants’ market share of DSL lines,
which are presumably served by sharing the incum-
bent’s network (EC 2014b). The primary measure of
facilities-based competition is broadband coverage
by standard cable (EC 2013a). Standard cable
broadband coverage would seem to be a good
measure of the full scope of potential facilities-
based competition to incumbent telephone
companies because of the ease with which standard
cable can be upgraded to DOCSIS 3. In any event
the difference between standard cable broadband
coverage and DOCSIS 3 coverage is not material:
94% of all standard cable broadband in Europe and
92% of all standard cable broadband in the U.S. had
already been upgraded to DOCSIS 3 by the end of
2012. Although the results are reported in terms of
standard cable, replacing standard cable coverage
with DOCSIS 3 coverage does not materially change
the results of the regressions.
Although the number of observations 
is qui te limited, the dataset reflects 
sufficient heterogeneity to support
regression analysis of the impact of
service-based and facilities-based 
competition on NGA coverage.
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10 The regressions also include controls for the percent-
age of the rural households as reported in the
European mapping study. The percentage of rural
households represents a better measure of urbaniza-
tion (and thus costs of providing broadband) than
population density. This is because the most impor-
tant consideration from the standpoint of NGA
coverage is what percentage of a country’s population
resides in nonrural areas. The fact that a country may
have large tracts of unoccupied land lowers its popu-
lation density, but does not make providing NGA
service to the vast majority of the population any
more difficult.
Take Sweden, for example. With 23 people per square
kilometer, it has one of the lowest population densities in
Europe, well below the EU average of 116 people per
square kilometer and even below the U.S. average of 34
people per square kilometer. At the same time, 85% of
the Swedish population is clustered in cities along the
coast and another 3% live in small towns (PTS 2013),
which are typically places with sufficient density to make
NGA service feasible. This places Sweden in the middle
of the pack in terms of urbanization (13th among 28 EU
countries) despite having the second lowest population
density in the EU (behind only Finland). Population den-
sity thus overstates how difficult it would be for Sweden
to achieve strong levels of NGA coverage.
Conversely, other countries have relatively low levels of
urbanization despite having relatively strong population
densities. For example, only 68% of Hungarians live in
nonrural areas, which places Hungary 26th of 28 EU
countries in terms of urbanization, despite the fact that
Hungary’s population density ranks 13th out of 28 EU
countries. Population density thus understates how dif-
ficult it would be for Hungary to achieve strong levels of
NGA coverage. The statistic contained in the European
mapping study reporting the proportion of households
that are rural (i.e., residing in areas with population
density less than 100 people per square kilometer)
thus represents a better control than population 
density.
The regressions also include controls for year fixed
effects and per capita GDP, adjusted for purchasing
power parity and normalized so that the EU average
equals 100 (Eurostat 2014). Because the errors are
not randomly distributed, standard errors are clustered
by country. To make sure that small countries do not
exercise a disproportionate impact on the results, the
regressions weight each country by population. One
could also regard each country as an independent 
policy experiment deserving of equal weight. If so, the
regressions should not be weighted by population.
Running the regression without weighting by population
does not materially change the results.
To test the impact of service-based and facilities-
based competition on NGA coverage, specification (1)
regresses the percentage of DSL provided by new
entrants against NGA coverage; specification (2)
regresses the degree of standard cable coverage
against NGA coverage; and specification (3)
regresses both variables against NGA coverage.
These regressions confirm that service-based compe-
tition has a strong negative effect on NGA coverage
and that facilities-based competition has a strong
positive effect on NGA coverage. All of these vari-
ables are statistically significant despite the fact that
the lack of observations limits the analytical power of
the regression. 
There are, however, two potential ambiguities in these
results. First, as noted earlier, DOCSIS 3 is the pri-
mary NGA platform, contributing more than any other
technology to NGA coverage. Because cable networks
were deployed to deliver multichannel video, it is
arguable that NGA coverage is not the product of
either facilities-based competition or service-based
competition, but is rather the path dependent out-
come of different forces. Second, because NGA
coverage is the combination of DOCSIS 3 coverage,
VDSL coverage, and FTTP coverage, NGA coverage
and DOCSIS 3 coverage are likely to be highly corre-
lated. Rather than indirectly spurring telephone-based
broadband providers into action, or cable broadband
could contribute directly by serving as a platform for
NGA coverage in and of itself.
The statistically significant results for specification
(1) suggest that cable modem coverage is not the
only important driver of NGA coverage, but specifica-
tions (2) and (3) are arguably ambiguous in this
regard, although it is possible to address this con-
The fact that a country may have large
tracts of unoccupied land lowers its 
population density, but does not make
providing NGA service to the entire 
population any more difficult.
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cern by reinterpreting specification (3) by treating
standard cable coverage as a control rather than as
an independent variable. If so, it shows that service-
based competition induced by access obligations still
has a negative effect on NGA coverage. Another
approach is reflected in specification (4), which iso-
lates the competitive impact of cable broadband on
incumbent telephone companies by eliminating Total
NGA coverage as the dependent variable and replac-
ing it with the sum of VDSL and FTTP. This new
dependent variable does not include DOCSIS 3 cover-
age as one of its components and reflects only those
aspects of NGA coverage that are spurred on by com-
petition from cable. 
Specification (4) confirms that that service-based
competition has a statistically significant negative
impact on NGA coverage provided by telephone com-
panies, while facilitates-based competition from cable
broadband has a statistically significant positive
impact on telephone companies. Alternatively, cable
broadband coverage may also be treated as a con-
trol. Either way, service-based competition has as a
statistically significant negative correlation with NGA
coverage. 
Conducting the same analysis on the rural data leads
to the same conclusions.
The data collected by the European mapping study
thus provides empirical support for claims that facili-
ties-based competition promotes investment in NGA
architectures and that regulation-induced service-
based competition discourages such investments.
That these regressions were able to yield such strong
results based on so few observations underscores
the strength of these effects. Indeed, many European
leaders have indicated that the time may have arrived
when Europe should shift its focus away from promot-
ing service-based competition and towards promoting
investment if it is to achieve the goal of 100% NGA
coverage by 2020 (Kroes 2013c;  Süddeutsche
Zeitung 2013 (quoting Angela Merkel)). The European
experience also provides a real-world example of the
TABLE 3:  
Impact of Service-Based and Facilities-Based Competition on Total NGA Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable Total NGA Total NGA Total NGA VDSL+FTTP
coverage coverage coverage coverage
Percentage DSL by new entrants –0.809*** –0.244† –0.770***
(0.247) (0.167) (0.219)
Standard cable coverage 0.845*** 0.818*** 0.288**
(0.84) (0.093) (0.115)
Percentage rural households –1.477* –0.617*** –0.655* –1.283**
(0.792) (0.218) (0.367) (0.473)
GDP per capita 0.0028* 0.0014* –0.0004 0.0019†
(0.0015) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0014)
Year 0.050*** 0.046*** 0.036** 0.084***
(0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.021)
Observations 55 55 55 55
R2 0.38 0.89 0.88 0.66
*** Significant at the 99% level;
** Significant at the 95% level; 
* Significant at the 90% level; 
† Significant at the 80% level.
THE EUROPEAN AND U.S. MAPPING STUDIES
12
consequences of subjecting the Internet to the regu-
latory regime that governs traditional telephone
service. This example should inform a wide range of
current issues, including the debate over reclassifying
broadband Internet access as a Title II telecommuni-
cations service, the IP transition, and House Energy
and Commerce Committee’s ongoing initiative to
update the U.S. communications laws.
THE EUROPEAN AND U.S. MAPPING STUDIES
TABLE 4:  
Impact of Service-Based and Facilities-Based Competition on Rural NGA Coverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Rural Rural Rural Rural
Dependent variable NGA NGA NGA VDSL+FTTP
coverage coverage coverage coverage
Percentage DSL by new entrants –0.635*** –0.208* –0.254*
(0.199) (0.112) (0.139)
Standard cable coverage 0.774*** 0.765*** 0.297**
(0.075) (0.078) (0.108)
Percentage rural households –1.391*** –0.635** –0.590** –0.720**
(0.429) (0.258) (0.267) (0.303)
GDP per capita 0.0028** –0.00006 0.0011 0.0010
(0.0012) (0.00071) (0.0008) (0.0009)
Year 0.045*** 0.058*** 0.030** 0.031**
(0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.015)
Observations 55 55 55 55
R2 0.50 0.90 0.84 0.58
*** Significant at the 99% level;
** Significant at the 95% level; 
* Significant at the 90% level.
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3. EUROPEAN AND U.S. STUDIES 
ON INVESTMENT, ADOPTION, 
DOWNLOAD SPEEDS, UTILIZATION,
AND PRICING
In addition to the mapping study, the EC has col-
lected a great deal of other important information.
First, the Commission collects investment data from
the National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs). Second, the
EC and the FCC collect information on broadband
adoption. Third, the EC and the FCC have commis-
sioned studies of broadband quality as measured in
download speeds (including a comparison to adver-
tised speeds), upload speeds, latency, and packet
loss. Fourth, the EC and the FCC have commissioned
studies of broadband pricing. In addition, commercial
entities have collected data on the amount of band-
width the average user consumes in different
countries. Together these data enrich the picture pro-
vided by the studies on broadband coverage. On the
whole, they tend to confirm the conclusion that the
U.S. is doing somewhat better than Europe with
respect to broadband.
3.1 Investment
The EC collects data on revenue and investment in the
electronic communications sector, which includes fixed-
line telecommunications, mobile telecommunications,
and pay television, among other things (EC 2009,
2010, 2014c). Although the U.S. government does not
collect similar data, the U.S. Telecom Association
(2013) compiles total broadband investments based
on financial reports filed by leading providers.
Household data from Eurostat (2014b) and the U.S.
Census Bureau (n.d.) can permit examining investment
levels on a per-household basis.
Sources:  EC (2009, 2010, 2014c); Eurostat (2014b); U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.); U.S. Telecom Association (n.d.).
FIGURE 5:  
Investment per Household in the Electronic Communications Sector in the U.S. and
Europe, 2007–2012
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The data on broadband investment reveals a stark dis-
parity between the U.S. and Europe. From 2007 to
2012, per household investment in the U.S. more than
doubled per household investment levels in Europe.
A paired t-test indicates that this difference is statisti-
cally significant at the 99.99% confidence level. The
difference between the U.S. and European per-house-
hold investment levels has widened following the
financial crisis in 2008. At the same time, revenue in
the European electronic communications sector has
declined by 1% to 2% each year since 2007 (EC 2009,
2010, 2014d).
The data also report investment levels on a per-coun-
try basis. If the U.S. were considered along with the
European data, it would rank third in terms of per-
household investment behind only Luxembourg at
$759 per household and Ireland at $584 per house-
hold (almost double the investment level in 2011)
and just ahead of Denmark at $457 per household.
The investment data thus seem to confirm the effec-
tiveness of the U.S. regulatory approach in providing
incentives to invest. Unless European investment
numbers rise sharply, Europe runs the risk of falling
farther behind in high-speed broadband coverage. 
3.2 Adoption
In addition to collecting information on NGA coverage,
both the European Commission and the FCC collect
data on NGA adoption. The FCC (2013b) reports sub-
scription numbers directly, which can be combined
FIGURE 6:  
Standard Broadband and NGA Adoption per Covered Household in the U.S. and Europe,
2011 and 2012
Sources:  EC  (2013b, 2014a); Eurostat (2014b); FCC (2013b); U.S. Census Bureau (n.d.).
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with coverage numbers to determine the percentage
of households where standard broadband and NGA
service are available actually subscribe. The
European Commission (2013c) reports information
about total broadband subscribership and the per-
centage of broadband lines that are NGA, which
makes it possible to calculate the number of NGA
subscribers. The NGA subscription data can be com-
bined with data on the number of households to
calculate the rate NGA adoption by household.
In terms of standard broadband, household adoption
numbers in the U.S. and Europe are very high and very
similar, with the U.S. being slightly ahead. Given the
slow growth, it would appear that standard broadband
adoption was nearing saturation in 2012. 
With respect to NGA, adoption is still in its nascent
stages. The U.S. lagged slightly behind Europe in
2011, but surged ahead in 2012, reaching 17% of
households as compared with 14% NGA penetration
in Europe. The primary driver was an increase in the
penetration in mobile wireless broadband providing
NGA speeds from 0% of U.S. households to 7% of
U.S. households.
The fact that adoption rates fall so far below coverage
rates indicates that the impediments to adoption do
not consist solely of lack of availability. This is con-
firmed by studies indicating that lack of interest and
perceived need are more important obstacles than
price or availability (EC 2013b, 13; Ofcom 2013a,
368; Pew Research Center Internet Project 2013).
This underscores that supply-side initiatives are not
enough and that policymakers should also continue to
pursue demand-side programs for stimulating adop-
tion of broadband.
3.3 Download Speeds and Other 
Measures of Broadband Quality
Both the EC and the FCC have recently sponsored
studies of broadband quality that produced data that
are significantly better than the data collected by the
OECD, which relies entirely on advertised speeds.
Academic studies indicate that the data produced by
the government studies are also better than the
widely cited data collected and reported by entities
such as Akamai, Cisco, and Ookla. Ookla’s NetIndex
speed test runs as an application on end-users’ com-
puters, which means that the results depend as
much on the configuration of the end users’ system,
such as the operating system and the quality of the
computer hardware, as the quality of the broadband
network. Ookla also relies on crowd sourcing to pro-
vide its data, which means that its data may not be
recruited from a representative sample and vary
depending on the location of the server being used
for the test. Akamai relies on data generated when
end users access web content hosted on its content
distribution network. Akamai’s strong position in
delivering web content (i.e., estimated at one fifth to
one third of the world’s web content) gives it suffi-
cient scope to observe a broad range of lines in
action, which avoids Ookla’s potential self-selection
and server-selection problems. Akamai still runs as
an application on end-users’ computers and thus is
affected by differences in each end-user’s setup.
Akamai focuses on a single application (web brows-
ing) and measures total connection speed between
the end user and the Akamai servers. This means
that it cannot account for connections to non-Akamai
servers. The Akamai test cannot distinguish conges-
tion in the access link caused by heavy utilization by
the end user (Bauer, Clark and Lehr 2013; ITIF 2013).
Fortunately for our purposes, the European
Commission and the FCC both relied on a company
called SamKnows to collect data on broadband qual-
ity. Instead of relying on the configurations end users’
computers, SamKnows recruits panels of consumers
who allow SamKnows to attach specially configured
monitoring units to their broadband connections that
periodically test download speeds, upload speeds,
latency, and packet loss. Unlike crowd-sourced tests,
SamKnows is able to ensure that its panel is unbi-
ased and conducts checks to guard against sample
bias. Because SamKnows employs its own hardware,
its results do not vary with the configuration of individ-
ual end users’ computers.
The consensus is that the SamKnows methodology is
superior to other commercially available measures of
average download speed, and that Akamai is likely the
second best source of data (Bauer, Clark and Lehr
The difference between the U.S. and
European per-household investment 
levels has widened following the 
financial crisis in 2008.
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2013; ITIF 2013). In fact, although the FCC used Ookla
data in its international broadband comparison, it
explicitly acknowledged that it would have preferred to
use SamKnows data, which at the time did not exist for
any European countries outside the UK (FCC 2012a
App. F at 1 n.1). Moreover, the SamKnows studies
commissioned by the European Commission and the
FCC were conducted only one month apart, with the
European study occurring in March 2012 and the U.S.
study occurring in April 2012. The results from these
studies for average download speeds during peak
times (weekdays 7:00-10:00 p.m.) are reported in
Figure 7. The average download speeds reported by
Akamai, Cisco, and Ookla’s NetIndex for the end of
2012 are also provided for comparison.
The SamKnows studies indicate that average down-
load speeds were somewhat faster in Europe than in
the U.S. in 2012. The SamKnows data indicate that
average upload speeds during peak times were also
somewhat faster in Europe (6.2 Mbps) than in the
U.S. (4.3 Mbps). Similar measures collected by other
sources suggest that U.S. average download speeds
were more or less the same as Europe’s, although
the Akamai results are somewhat lower than the
other measurements. As noted above, all of these
other measures are subject to at least some degree
of methodological criticism. For the purposes of this
study, however, the relative difference between U.S.
FIGURE 7:  
Average Download Speeds in the U.S. and Europe, 2012
Sources:  EC (2013d); FCC (2012b); Akamai (2013); Cisco (n.d.); Ookla (n.d.).
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during peak usage times (weekdays from
7:00-10:00 p.m.), U.S. providers deliver
96% of the advertised speeds, while
European providers deliver only 74%.
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and European download speeds are what is impor-
tant, not the absolute magnitude.
The European study was designed to compare actual to
advertised speeds. As a result, the European study
does not report country-level data for download speeds,
although Akamai, Cisco, and NetIndex do. Under the
Akamai data, which reports data for twenty-one EU
countries plus Iceland and Norway, the U.S. would rank
third in terms of average download speeds behind only
the Netherlands and the Czech Republic as of the end
of 2012. Cisco reports average download speeds for
five Western European countries and for Western
Europe as a whole. If the U.S. were compared with
these other countries, it would rank third of six as of the
end of 2012. NetIndex’s country-level data is less flat-
tering to the U.S. If the U.S. were ranked along with the
twenty-six EU countries for which Net Index provides
data as of the end of 2012, it would rank eighteenth.
In terms of actual and advertised speeds, U.S. ISPs
fare better than their European counterparts. In terms
of average download speeds during peak usage times
(weekdays from 7:00-10:00 p.m.), U.S. providers
deliver 96% of the advertised speeds, while European
providers deliver only 74%. In terms of upload speeds,
U.S. providers exceed their promises, providing actual
upload speeds that average 107% of advertised
FIGURE 8:  
Actual Speeds as a Percentage of Advertised Speeds During Peak Times in the U.S. and
Europe, 2012
Sources:  EC (2013d); FCC (2012b).
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This is particularly so because actual
download speeds in Europe average
74% of the advertised speeds, whereas
U.S. broadband services averages 96%
of advertised speeds.
18 FIGURE 9:  
Latency and Packet Loss in the U.S. and Europe, 2012
Sources:  EC (2013d); FCC (2012b).
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speeds during peak times, while European ISPs only
provide 88% of their advertised speeds. 
The European and FCC studies also included two
other measures of broadband quality. First, latency is
the amount of time that a packet takes to reach its
destination. Note that latency is different from band-
width. Bandwidth determines how much volume an
end user can send; latency determines how long it
takes to arrive at its destination. If the Internet were
analogized to a pipe, bandwidth would be determined
by the diameter of the pipe, while latency would be
determined by its length (although other factors such
as router configuration, firewalls, network protocols,
and reliance and dispersion of data centers also
have an impact). Latency and bandwidth are both
critical to a good end-user experience. Unlike band-
width, lower latency numbers represent better
performance. 
Second, packet loss is the percentage of packets that
fail to reach their destination. Packet loss also affects
the end-user experience, as any packets sent using
TCP that are dropped must be resent, which slows
down applications and adds additional burdens on the
network. As with latency, for packet loss a lower num-
ber means better performance.
On both of these additional metrics, the European
study indicates that U.S. ISPs outperformed their
European counterparts in 2012. During peak times
(weekdays from 7:00-10:00 p.m.), average latency is
lower in the U.S. (31 milliseconds) than in Europe (33
milliseconds). Similarly, packet loss during peak times
is lower in the U.S. (0.18%) than in Europe (0.50%).
The data suggest that average download and upload
speeds may be somewhat faster in Europe, but that
the gap is reasonably small. On other measures of
broadband quality, such as actual as a percentage of
EUROPEAN AND U.S. STUDIES
19FIGURE 10:  
Monthly IP Traffic per User in the U.S. and Europe (GB/month), 2011 and 2012
Sources:  Cisco (n.d.).
0
10
5
20
15
25
30
2011 2012
US
EU
21
14
27
18
advertised speeds, latency, and packet loss, the U.S.
fares better than Europe.
3.4 Utilization
In some ways, download speeds and the other met-
rics of broadband quality are secondary measures of
the value of broadband service. It is arguable that the
better metric is total traffic per user, as a real meas-
ure of the value of a broadband connection is total
amount of usage. Neither the European Commission
nor the FCC reports data on bandwidth usage. Cisco
does report data on the amount of traffic that each
user generates each month for the United States, the
five largest Western European countries, and for a cat-
egory it calls the “Rest of Western Europe,” which
includes thirteen other countries. While the overlap
with the European Union is not perfect, the European
utilization data can be aggregated and weighted to
provide the basis for a comparison of utilization.
These data reveal that in both 2011 and 2012, U.S.
users consumed 50% more bandwidth than European
users. Evaluating the same data on a per household
basis does not materially change the analysis. The
heavier utilization suggests that U.S. users are deriving
greater value from their Internet connections than
European users, as a fast connection only provides
value to the extent it is used.
3.5 Pricing
The EU also commissioned a study of broadband pric-
ing that was conducted in February 2012. The study
identifies large ISPs representing 90% of subscribers
up to a maximum of 8. It looks at the lowest and
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European Study of Pricing of Standalone Broadband in the U.S. and Europe, 2012
Sources:  EC (2012b).
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median advertised price for all EU countries; other
European countries, including Iceland, Liechtenstein,
Macedonia, Norway, Switzerland and Turkey; and the
states of California, Colorado, and New York. In so
doing, it attempts to take into account contract length,
data caps, nonrecurring costs, promotions, differences
in volume and other services, VAT, and purchasing
power parity. The study tracks standalone broadband as
well as two-product and three-product bundles, although
prices for bundles that include television typically reflect
the high cost of program acquisition and not just the
cost of Internet service. Unlike other studies that have
received recent attention (see, e.g., New America
Foundation 2012), the European study looks at pricing
nationwide instead of particular cities and reports data
for standalone broadband in addition to bundles, which
reflect content acquisition costs for video.
Despite these refinements, the resulting methodology
is still subject to a number of caveats. The study is
based on advertised prices, but discounts and other
measures can cause actual prices to differ. Although
the study takes advertised discounts into account, it
does not reflect any special discounts that may be
extended. In addition, the study is based on advertised
speeds, which only imperfectly reflect actual speeds.
This is particularly so because actual download speeds
in Europe average 74% of the advertised speeds,
whereas U.S. broadband services averages 96% of
advertised speeds. In addition, broadband pricing can
obscure important differences in utilization. Finally, with
respect to all of these measures, simply choosing the
median fails to take into account the fact that some
providers have many more subscribers and thus are
more representative. Pricing data should thus be
regarded as suggestive rather than definitive.
To isolate the cost of Internet service and to eliminate
the impact of program acquisition costs for television
or universal service subsidies and other similar sur-
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21charges for voice, the discussion that follows focuses
on the price of standalone broadband. Figure 11
reports the median EU price for standalone broadband
in each speed tier included in the European study. The
U.S. price is a simple average of the prices reported for
California, Colorado, and New York.
The data indicate that U.S. broadband prices are lower
than European prices for all service tiers up to 12
Mbps. Even for services between 12 Mbps and 30
Mbps, the price difference is relatively small. Only for
speeds greater than 30 Mbps were U.S. prices signifi-
cantly higher. The fact that the average U.S. user
consumes 50% more capacity than the average
European user will inevitably show up in the pricing.
Indeed, the price difference for 30+ Mbps service 
($61 in the U.S. vs. $37 in the EU) matches almost
exactly the difference in monthly household bandwidth
usage (60 GB in the U.S. vs. 40 GB in Western Europe)
(Cisco n.d.).
Thus, for lower speeds, the European study provides
reason to question whether U.S. prices are in fact
higher than European prices. Data collected by the ITU
(2013, table 3.2) and the Berkman Center (2010, 75)
similarly indicate that U.S. entry-level broadband pricing
is lower than European entry-level broadband pricing,
while other studies found it to be roughly comparable
(OECD 2013 fig. 7.6; FCC 2012a fig. 2a). The higher
levels of utilization in the U.S. provide a strong justifica-
tion for the price difference for higher-speed tiers.
Indeed, there is a strong argument that charging low-
volume users less and charging high-volume users
more may represent a fairer and more efficient alloca-
tion of costs.
The European pricing study thus undercuts claims that
high U.S. prices are discouraging potential end users
from adopting broadband. The FCC and ITU data con-
firm that U.S. broadband prices are lower for lower
speeds. Indeed, the ITU indicates that the U.S. has the
third cheapest entry-level price in the world. U.S. prices
are somewhat higher than European prices for speeds
greater than 30 Mbps. In fact, this is precisely the type
of pricing structure that would best promote broadband
adoption and alleviate the digital divide. Even the
higher prices for higher speed services can be justified
by the fact that U.S. users consume 50% more band-
width than their European counterparts.
*  *  *
The data reported in the European mapping study thus
contradict claims that U.S. broadband service is falling
behind Europe in terms of availability. In addition,
regression analysis of these data indicate that the U.S.
approach of promoting facilities-based competition is
more effective in stimulating the buildout of high-speed
networks than the European approach of promoting
service-based competition. Moreover, the data on
investment, average download speed, utilization, and
pricing are thus all at odds with blanket assertions that
U.S. broadband is too slow and too costly, since U.S.
investment levels are higher, average download speeds
are slightly below or comparable, entry-level pricing is
lower, and utilization levels are higher. On the whole,
the data are more consistent with the position that the
U.S. is ahead of Europe in the broadband race and well
positioned to extend its lead. 
The widescale availability and relatively affordable pric-
ing in lower speed tiers underscores the fact that price
is not the primary barrier to broadband adoption.
Indeed, studies indicate that households who have fast
service would only pay $3 more for very fast service
(Rosston, Savage, and Waldman 2011). Both U.S. and
European studies have consistently shown that lack of
interest and lack of skills are far greater barriers to
broadband adoption than are pricing and coverage (EC
2013b, 13; Ofcom 2013a, 368; Pew Research Center
Internet Project 2013). Any true welfare metric should
also determine the relationship between broadband
adoption and GDP. 
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4. COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
The data provided by the European and U.S. mapping
studies provide a fairly compelling basis for conclud-
ing that the U.S. is not behind Europe in the
broadband race. That said, bare statistics often do
not tell the full story. The eight country case studies
presented in this section add insight to the top-level
statistical analysis. These case studies focus on the
more established economies of Western Europe,
including the five largest EU countries (France,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom) and
three additional countries of particular interest
(Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands).
The analysis organizes the countries into three cate-
gories based on (1) the level of development of the
cable modem industry, measured by whether cable
modem coverage exceeded coverage levels of the EU
as a whole, and (2) the primary broadband strategy pur-
sued by the telephone industry, determined by whether
FTTP coverage was greater than VDSL coverage or vice
versa. The resulting categories are:
• Countries where telephone companies faced weak
competition from cable and emphasized FTTP over
VDSL (Sweden, France, and Italy),
• Countries where telephone companies faced weak
competition from cable and emphasized VDSL over
FTTP (none),
• Countries where telephone companies faced strong
competition from cable and emphasized FTTP over
VDSL (Denmark and Spain), and
• Countries where telephone companies faced strong
competition from cable and emphasized VDSL over
FTTP (the Netherlands, UK, and Germany).
A close analysis of these country case studies reveals
an interesting pattern that raises serious doubts about
certain countries’ continuing emphasis on FTTP.  First,
the group of countries that did not face significant facil-
ities-based competition from cable (all of which
emphasized FTTP over VDSL) reported the three lowest
NGA coverage levels of all the countries included in this
study and ranked 20th, 25th, and 28th out of 28 EU
countries in this regard even though Sweden and
France are often held up as role models that other
countries should follow. NGA coverage in Sweden was
only slightly above EU coverage levels despite the pres-
ence of strong FTTP deployments (with 40% to 50% of
these lines being government owned) and remains well
below the NGA coverage levels in the U.S. The empha-
sis on FTTP also had an adverse impact on rural NGA
deployments. The high cost of FTTP is leading France
and Italy to consider shifting their focus to VDSL. 
In contrast, all of the countries in which cable broad-
band was highly developed achieved NGA coverage
rates that exceeded EU coverage levels. Indeed, most
of these countries report that cable broadband consti-
tuted the primary driver of NGA coverage. Among these,
two countries have historically emphasized FTTP over
VDSL (Denmark and Spain). Denmark is unusual in
that it is the only country in which the incumbent tele-
phone operator was permitted to continue to be the
primary cable operator. As a result, competition came
from energy companies deploying FTTP instead of cable
modem service, although these new entrants have
struggled financially. Spain followed a more conven-
tional pattern, in which competition from cable modem
service has spurred the incumbent telephone provider
to invest in upgrading its network. The primary empha-
sis has been on FTTP, although the Spanish regulator
has recognized that VDSL is likely to play an important
role outside of the largest cities.
Countries with strong cable modem systems and where
incumbent telephone companies emphasized VDSL
also exceeded EU benchmarks for NGA coverage. An
underappreciated gem is the Netherlands, which had
the second highest NGA coverage rates in the EU. The
Netherlands achieved this based on nearly universal
DOCSIS 3 coverage, based on its legacy of municipally
subsidized cable television systems, and a recognition
that it must balance the financial risks associated with
FTTP with investments in VDSL. The other two countries
in this group (the UK and Germany) have embraced
VDSL largely to the exclusion of FTTP. In both cases,
strong competition from cable is the primary driver of
VDSL investment, with both countries regarding VDSL
as being able to deliver sufficient bandwidth to justify
postponing the more significant investments associ-
ated with FTTP for the time being.
Spain followed a more conventional 
pattern, in which competition from
cable modem service has spurred the
incumbent telephone provider to invest
in upgrading its network.
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With respect to LTE, early deployments typically
depended on two key considerations. The first was the
timing of the auction to allocate the 2.6 GHz licenses.
The second was a willingness to allow current providers
to reallocate their 2G spectrum in the 1.8 GHz band ini-
tially allocated to GSM to LTE.
A few comments on the data sources for the tables are
in order. The primary data sources are the mapping
studies commissioned by the EC and the U.S. govern-
ment measuring coverage as of the end of 2012 (EC
2013a; NTIA and FCC 2013a and 2013b). Data on
European investment levels are from the data collected
by the EC (2014b). Pricing data are from the EC pricing
study (2012b). Download speed data is from Akamai
(2013). Bandwidth usage data are from Cisco (n.d.).
Population density and GDP per capita (measured in
terms of purchasing power parity) are from Eurostat
(2014a, 2014c). 
4.1 Weak Competition from Cable and 
FTTP over VDSL
Three study countries faced DOCSIS 3 penetration that
fell below EU levels:  Sweden, France, and Italy. All of
these countries have historically emphasized FTTP over
VDSL. Strikingly, these three countries represent the
lowest NGA coverage rates of any countries included in
this study. In fact, Italy had the lowest NGA coverage of
any country in the entire EU, and France had the fourth
lowest. Only Sweden enjoyed NGA coverage that
exceeded NGA coverage levels for the EU as a whole,
and even that advantage was relatively minor (57% vs.
54%) and ranked it 20th among 28 EU countries.
4.1.1 Sweden
Sweden is often regarded as a leader in broadband
infrastructure, having issued the first national broad-
band plan and established the first LTE network.
Sweden remains one of Europe’s strongest advocates
for FTTP. Media articles often identify Sweden as a
country the U.S. should consider emulating, owing pri-
marily to the prevalence of FTTP. These commentators
assert that services are much faster and cheaper in
Stockholm than in the U.S. (see, e.g., New York Times
2014b; USA Today 2014). Sweden is accomplishing
this even though their population density is lower than
the United States’ (NPR 2014).
Sweden has FTTP coverage rates that far exceed the
FTTP coverage rates in the EU as a whole, driven by
large public subsidies of FTTP. This advantage has not
translated into significantly greater availability of high-
speed broadband services, however. NGA coverage was
53% in 2011 and 57% in 2012, which was only slightly
above the EU NGA coverage rates of 48% in 2011 and
53% in 2012 and far below the U.S. NGA coverage
rates of 72% and 81%. Sweden’s 57% NGA coverage
rate ranked it 20th among 28 EU countries, and among
the countries in this study, Sweden trailed every coun-
try except for France and Italy. Thus, even though
Sweden is generally seen as a leader in broadband
Total Rural DOCSIS VDSL FTTP LTE Pct. DSL
NGA NGA 3 cable shared
Sweden 57% 6% 35% 17% 46% 93% 37%
Europe 54% 12% 39% 25% 12% 27% 46%
U.S. 82% 48% 81% 10% 23% 86% n/a
Investment Price Avg. Bandwidth Rural Population GDP
per HH 12-30 speed per user HHs density per
Mbps Mbps capita
Sweden $280 $18.15 7.3 n/a 17% 23 125
Europe $244 $27.64 5.7 18 15% 116 100
U.S. $562 $28.76 7.4 27 19% 34 152
24 technology, it is actually lagging behind countries that
have emphasized VDSL, such as the UK and Germany,
and other countries that have pursued more balanced
strategies, such as the Netherlands, Denmark, and
Spain. Because of its fiber-oriented strategy, NGA cover-
age is projected to grow very slowly through 2018, at
which time Sweden will lag every major European coun-
try except Italy (Analysys Mason 2013).
The problem was even more pronounced in rural
areas. Swedish rural NGA coverage reached only 5%
in 2011 and 6% in 2012. This fell short of the EU
rural NGA coverage rates of 9% and 12% and fell far
short of the U.S. rural NGA coverage rates of 38% and
48%. Thus, while the emphasis on FTTP did support
world-class service in Sweden’s largest cities, it also
caused the urban-rural digital divide to become worse. 
Broadband prices remain quite affordable, and down-
load speeds are close to those of the U.S., although
investment levels are somewhat lower. Sweden did
enjoy a sharp increase in LTE coverage from 48% in
2011 to 93% in 2012, which allowed it to surpass LTE
coverage rates in the U.S.
One brief observation about population density is in
order. Although some commentators point out that
Sweden has a lower population density (23 people
per square kilometer) than the United States (34 peo-
ple  per square kilometer), a higher percentage of
Swedes live in urban areas than Americans. As noted
above, the low Swedish population density figures
reflect the fact that large amounts of Swedish terri-
tory are unoccupied and need not be covered by
broadband. The European mapping study indicates
that only 17% of Swedes live in rural areas, a statis-
tic corroborated by Sweden’s national broadband
plan, (Government Offices of Sweden 2013).
Furthermore, NGA buildout is further facilitated by the
fact that half of all Swedes live in apartment build-
ings (ITIF 2013).
VDSL
VDSL has represented a fairly minor technology in
Sweden, covering only 17% of the country in both 2011
and 2012, somewhat below the EU benchmarks of
19% and 25%. Swedish Rural NGA coverage was nomi-
nal at 0.2% both years, again below the EU
benchmarks of 3% and 5%.
Although telephone service was initiated by private
companies, by 1918 the service had become a state-
owned monopoly. The incumbent Telia was partially
privatized in 1990 and merged with the Finnish incum-
bent Sonera in 2003. The Swedish government still
owns 37% of Telia Sonera, and the Finnish government
still owns 13.2%. 
DSL was commercially introduced in Sweden around
1999 and quickly became the leading broadband tech-
nology through subscriptions provided by the incumbent
Telia and by competitors such as Telenor, who leased
lines following the Swedish regulator’s decision to
impose local loop unbundling. Sweden was also an
early pioneer in VDSL, with new entrant
Bredbandsbolaget (now part of Telenor) conducting
tests as early as October 2005 and Telia Sonera pro-
viding service starting in March 2008 and pledging SEK
500 million to expand the service in 2012. 
The Swedish regulator (PTS) has not supported upgrad-
ing the copper network to VDSL because it believes
that VDSL will achieve 100 Mbps download speeds
only in densely populated areas that are already likely
to receive service from FTTP (PTS 2013b). Particularly
given the government’s continued ownership of a large
stake in Telia Sonera, Sweden is likely to continue to
emphasize FTTP over VDSL.
DOCSIS 3
Cable broadband has been an important contributor to
NGA coverage in Sweden, but has not been the leading
NGA technology. DOCSIS 3 was available in 31% of
Swedish households in 2011 and 35% in 2012. This
fell slightly short of the EU benchmarks of 37% and
39% and well below the U.S. coverage rates of 72%
and 81%. Rural DOCSIS 3 coverage was almost nonex-
istent at 0.1% in both 2011 and 2012.
The Swedish regulator (PTS) has not
supported upgrading the copper 
network to VDSL because of its belief
that VDSL will achieve 100 Mbps down-
load speeds only in densely populated
areas that are already likely to receive
service from FTTP (PTS 2013b).
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public broadcasters until 1981, when local master
antenna television systems began retransmitting inter-
national satellite programming. In 1983, the
government agency responsible for telecommunica-
tions in Sweden established Televerket Kabel-TV, which
would ultimately occupy 75% of the cable television
market. The company was named Svenska Kabel-TV
during the 1993 divestiture that created Telia and later
rebranded as Telia InfoMedia TeleVision in 1996. Telia
prepared to spin off its cable properties in 1999 in
anticipation of its proposed but ultimately unsuccessful
merger with Telenor and finally sold the business to pri-
vate equity firm EQT as part of its 2003 merger with
Sonera. Since that time, it has been acquired by a suc-
cession of private equity funds, including the Carlyle
Group and Providence Equity Partners (2006) and BC
Partners (2011).
Cable has remained a relatively minor broadband tech-
nology, representing 18% of the market for fixed
broadband. Moreover, the number of cable broadband
subscriptions began to decline slightly in 2012 in the
face of vigorous competition from FTTP and LTE (PTS
2013b). As a result, the Swedish regulator PTS does
not consider DOCSIS 3 technology as playing a critical
role in helping Sweden reach the speed and coverage
targets established by the Digital Agenda.
FTTP
FTTP covered 46% of Swedish homes in 2011 and
2012, well above EU coverage levels of 10% and 12%
as well as U.S. coverage levels of 17% and 23%.
Sweden is thus one of Europe’s leaders in FTTP, ranking
behind only Lithuania, Latvia, and Romania. 
Unsurprisingly, FTTP has focused on urban areas. FTTP
reached only 5% of Swedish rural households in 2011
and 6% in 2012. This was slightly above the EU bench-
marks of 2% and 5%, but slightly below the U.S.
benchmarks of 6% and 8%.
Government subsidies have long played a key role in
promoting FTTP in Sweden. For example, Government
Bill 1999/2000:86, entitled “An information society for
all,” provided for SEK 5.6 billion ($640 million) in gov-
ernment funding to defray the SEK 40 billion ($4.6
billion) to extend optical fiber to rural areas, with the
total cost of extending fiber to all of Sweden reaching
SEK 57 billion ($6.6 billion). Government Bill
2004/05:175, entitled, “From an IT policy for society
to a policy for the information society,” allocated €525
million ($76 million) for infrastructure funding and
€57.5 million ($7 million) for structural funds and
other regional grants. The result was pervasive govern-
ment ownership of broadband facilities. According to
the Swedish national broadband plan, central govern-
ment agencies and government-owned companies
owned 15% to 20% of the nation’s fiber infrastructure
as of 2008, and another 25% to 30% was owned by
municipalities (Government Offices of Sweden 2009,
22, 25).
The central government has continued to provide public
support for FTTP. For example, from 2010 through
2012, PTS has provided SEK 178.5 million ($27 mil-
lion) in funding to provide 35,000 homes and
businesses in rural areas with broadband via fiber,
which represents a cost of roughly $800 per location.
PTS allocated an additional SEK 160 million ($25 mil-
lion) for 2013. During the same period, municipalities
continued to invest SEK 8–9 million ($1.2–1.3 million)
each year. Private companies have invested roughly
SEK 8–9 billion ($1.1–$1.2 billion) annually since
2005. In 2012, Telia Sonera announced that it would
invest SEK 5 billion ($800 million) to extend FTTP to 1
million additional homes.
PTS made clear in 2013 that it regards FTTP as the
only technology capable of achieving the 100 Mbps tar-
gets established by the Digital Agenda. Moreover, PTS
has an ongoing proceeding that would include FTTP in
the product market for network infrastructure. If final-
ized, this proceeding would require Telia Sonera to
provide unbundled access to its FTTP network as well
as its copper network. The proceeding is scheduled for
completion in spring 2014.
One of the primary reasons that LTE has
deployed so quickly in Sweden is the
speed with which it conducted its spec-
trum auctions. In May 2008, Sweden
became the second country (behind
only Norway) to auction its 2.6 MHz
spectrum. The licenses were technology
and service neutral. 
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FTTP coverage rates, they did not translate into NGA
coverage levels that significantly exceeded the prevail-
ing levels in the EU or the U.S. In addition, the
emphasis on FTTP had an adverse impact on rural
coverage, where FTTP is unviable.
LTE
Sweden has long been a global leader in LTE. Swedish
LTE coverage surged from 48% in 2011 to 93% in
2012, well above the EU benchmarks of 8% and 27%.
During this time, Sweden appears to have passed the
U.S. in terms of LTE coverage, which was 68% in
January 2012 and 86% in October 2012. Rural LTE cov-
erage rates made even more impressive gains,
skyrocketing from 7% in 2011 to 71% in 2012, far
exceeding the EU benchmarks of 5% and 10% 
One of the primary reasons that LTE has deployed so
quickly in Sweden is the speed with which it conducted
its spectrum auctions. In May 2008, Sweden became
the second country (behind only Norway) to auction its
2.6 MHz spectrum. The licenses were technology and
service neutral. 
In December 2009, Telia Sonera used this spectrum to
deploy the world’s first LTE service. Telia Sonera execu-
tives acknowledged that the early deployment was
mostly to gain prestige and that the company recog-
nized that the lack of devices meant that subscriptions
would be predictably slow to develop until 2013. In
November 2010, Tele2 and Telenor began offering LTE
through a spectrum-sharing joint venture known as
Net4Mobility, which achieved its goal of 99% coverage
by early 2013. 
3 Sweden would enter the fray shortly, albeit following a
somewhat different strategy. In December 2010, 3
Sweden acquired the unpaired block that Intel won in
the 2.6 GHz auction and combined it with the paired
block 3 Sweden acquired in the same auction. The
company then used the combined spectrum holdings to
launch a multimode LTE service in December 2011. 3
Sweden plans to cover 95% of the country by the end
of 2014.
In March 2011, Sweden became the second country
(behind only Germany) to auction its 800 MHz digital
dividend spectrum. A spectrum cap of 2x10 MHz per
bidder was imposed by a decision by PTS. In addition,
the recipient of one designated license (won by
Net4Mobility, which is a joint venture of Tele2 and
Telenor) would bear the obligation to cover the perma-
nent homes and fixed places of business identified as
lacking 1 Mbps broadband service. The government
provided a subsidy of SEK 300 million ($47 million) to
support the buildout of these homes. The 800 MHz
spectrum is now being used to complement the LTE
networks deployed at 2.6 GHz and to provide rural cov-
erage, although the 2x10 MHz cap means that each
800 MHz licenses provides only half of the spectrum
required for maximum LTE performance.
In October 2011, Sweden auctioned off spectrum in
the 1.8 GHz band that had previously been allocated to
GSM. Telia Sonera and Net4Mobility each acquired
licenses, although neither would deploy service until
2013. In addition, 900 MHz and 1800 MHz will be
gradually developed for 4G network for the future as
well, with the transition for 1800 MHz starting in 2013. 
*  *  *
Sweden has chosen to emphasize FTTP over VDSL and
has achieved impressive level of FTTP coverage. It
achieved these coverage numbers through large gov-
ernment subsidies. In the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis, other countries would no doubt find it
difficult to follow the same path. More importantly,
these large public investments in FTTP failed to create
any significant advantages in terms of NGA coverage.
At 57%, Sweden’s NGA coverage is only slightly above
the 2012 EU benchmark of 54% and ranks 20th
among 28 EU countries. 
The shortcomings of emphasizing FTTP without the
support of collateral technologies are manifest in
Sweden’s poor NGA coverage in rural areas. The high
cost of FTTP means that it is not commercially viable
in many rural areas. As a result, Sweden’s rural NGA
coverage is roughly half that of the rest of Europe and
one eighth that of the U.S. Thus, while Sweden’s com-
mitment to FTTP has no doubt yielded impressive
service in Stockholm and other cities, those benefits
In March 2011, Sweden became the
second country (behind only Germany)
to auction its 800 MHz digital dividend
spectrum.
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27are not available on a nationwide basis. This stands in
stark contrast to other countries, where greater
reliance on DOCSIS 3 and VDSL has supported more
extensive rural coverage.
4.1.2 France
France is another country that is often identified as a
broadband leader and is often lauded for having fast
service and cheap prices. As was the case with
Sweden, France has emphasized FTTP over other NGA
technologies, and companies such as Free are
renowned for offering low-cost service.
The data on NGA coverage paint a very different pic-
ture. France achieved only 23% NGA coverage in 2011
and 24% in 2012, both of which were less than half the
EU benchmarks of 48% and 54% and far below the
U.S. benchmarks of 73% and 82%. Indeed, French NGA
coverage is the fourth worst in the entire EU. French
rural NGA coverage is virtually nonexistent, checking in
at 0% in 2011 and 1% in 2012, far short of EU levels
of 9% and 12% and U.S. levels of 38% and 48%.
French LTE coverage was 0% in 2011 and only 6% in
2012, as compared with 8% and 27% in the EU and
68% and 86% in the U.S. Although prices are low and
investment levels are above average, download speeds
lag behind European norms. 
Consistent with the tradition of strong government
involvement in shaping battles between business
rivals that dates back to 17th-century finance minister
Jean-Baptiste Colbert, the central government has
asserted greater control over the French telecommuni-
cations industry than was the case in other countries,
beginning with the government’s assertion of a monop-
oly over the optical telegraph system in 1792 (Millward
2005, 104; New York Times 2014a). For example, after
initially permitting private development of the tele-
phone system in 1879, the French subsequently
nationalized the phone system in 1889. Not only did
the central government insist on building the phone
system itself. Because the French government lacked
the funds to expand the system, citizens who wished
to have service had to raise the funds to cover the
costs of construction and loan them to the govern-
ment interest free, with the principal to be repaid out
of the profits if the system proved successful. This
forced consumers to bear all of the risk of extending
telephone service but receive none of the potential
benefits (Brock 1981). 
This legacy of top-down planning caused French tele-
phone coverage to lag behind the rest of Europe well
into the 1970s and is reflected in the well-known state-
run Internet forerunner known as Minitel. In addition,
the French were unenthusiastic supporters of liberaliza-
tion during the 1990s and instead favored maintaining
the telephone system as a government-owned monop-
oly. Indeed, the French government continues to own
27% of Orange, 13.5% directly and 13.5% indirectly
through the French Sovereign Fund (Fonds stratégique
d’investissement).
Total Rural DOCSIS VDSL FTTP LTE Pct. DSL
NGA NGA 3 cable shared
France 24% 1% 21% 0% 7% 6% 56%
Europe 54% 12% 39% 25% 12% 27% 46%
U.S. 82% 48% 81% 10% 23% 86% n/a
Investment Price Avg. Bandwidth Rural Population GDP
per HH 12-30 speed per user HHs density per
Mbps Mbps capita
France $326 $24.25 4.8 12 18% 103 109
Europe $244 $27.64 5.7 18 15% 116 100
U.S. $562 $28.76 7.4 27 19% 34 152
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28 VDSL
ADSL service appeared in France 1999 and soon saw
vibrant service-based competition emerge through
unbundling. Somewhat surprisingly, VDSL was slow to
develop, with coverage rates of 0% in both 2011 and
2012, well below EU coverage rates of 19% and 24%. 
The reason is simple:  consistent with its tradition of
centralized control over the infrastructure, the French
regulator, ARCEP, refused to approve VDSL as a stan-
dard. As a result, it focused instead on promoting
FTTP and ADSL+. Even as late as 2010, Orange was
continuing to invest in improving ADSL coverage from
98.6% to 99% by 2013. 
It was not until April 2013 that ARCEP finally approved
VDSL2, and even then it offered the pessimistic
assessment that VDSL2 would benefit only 16% of all
lines in France and would provide 30 Mbps service in
only 6% of French homes. ARCEP thus saw VDSL2 as a
complementary technology that it would support with
public funding only if it represented an intermediate
step towards FTTP. Orange, Free, and SFR formally
launched VDSL2 service in October 2013, although the
firms had conducted small-scale field trials before that
date. Orange has begun to deploy vectoring technolo-
gies that can support download speeds of 50 Mbps in
many areas and download speeds of up to 100 Mbps
under optimal conditions.
In February 2014, ARCEP opened a consultation on a
new VDSL technology known as Fiber to the
Distribution Point (FTTDP) that will push fiber even
closer to the consumer. Many see FTTDP as a way to
deliver 100 Mbps in a more affordable manner than
FTTP. Given the high costs of FTTP, these observers
believe that France may well switch focus away from
FTTP and towards VDSL.
DOCSIS 3
French cable broadband has also tended to lag behind
the rest of Europe as well. DOCSIS 3 was available in
only 21% of French homes in 2011 and 2012. These
coverage rates were well below the EU rates of 37%
and 39% and the U.S. rates of 72% and 81%. French
rural DOCSIS 3 coverage was 0% in both 2011 and
2012.
As was the case with telephony, French television has
long been characterized by strong government influ-
ence and slow development. Initially, the French
government restricted cable operators to retransmit-
ting over-the-air broadcast signals. It was not until
1982 that the National Cable Plan dissolved the
broadcasters’ monopoly over video programming. This
program, which was fully funded by public money,
allowed municipalities to grant monopoly licenses to
selected companies, all of which were built by France
Télécom. As was the case with telephony, municipali-
ties were expected to help finance the buildout by
providing interest-free loans. Water companies, which
were able to leverage their relationships with municipal
governments, were particularly successful in attracting
licenses. The lack of funds caused the cable buildout
to proceed very slowly. In 1986, France began to allow
greater entry by private firms. France Télécom
remained the dominant player until the mid 2000s,
when it divested its cable business as well as its
investment in major cable companies such as Noos.
By 2006, a series of mergers consolidated the vast
majority of regional cable companies in the hands of a
single company, Numericable. As of February 2014,
Numericable had reached 5 million homes and was
targeting 8.5 million by 2016. 
Despite this consolidation, cable remains a minor
player in the French broadband industry. As of
September 2013, ADSL was the leading broadband
technology (22.4 million subscribers), followed by FTTP
(1.4 million subscribers). Cable providers served only
0.5 million NGA subscribers and likely served a signifi-
cant proportion of the 0.4 million standard broadband
subscribers in the category marked “other broadband
access,” giving it at most 0.9 million subscribers.
Interestingly, Numericable’s recent presentations of its
financial results clearly indicate that it is focusing on
FTTP for future growth. Its FTTP-oriented strategy is
likely to increase following completion of its acquisition
of telephone provider SFR announced in April 2014.
French rural NGA coverage is virtually non-
existent, checking in at 0% in 2011 and
1% in 2012, far short of EU levels of 9%
and 12% and U.S. levels of 38% and 48%. 
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Despite all of the emphasis placed on FTTP, French
FTTP coverage has continued to lag well behind the rest
of Europe. FTTP coverage was 4% in 2011 and 7% in
2012, which fell far short of the EU benchmarks of
10% and 12% and the U.S. benchmarks of 17% and
23%. French rural FTTP increased from 0% in 2011 to a
mere 0.6% in 2012. Again, these fell short of EU cover-
age levels of 0% and 3% and U.S. coverage levels of
6% and 8%.
FTTP has performed poorly in France despite the fact
that it has long been the target of government subsi-
dies. Perhaps the most controversial example is
THD92, the FTTH subsidy program for Hauts-de-Seine
targeted at one of the wealthiest suburban Paris
departments, which already had a healthy broadband
infrastructure. Initiated by Nicolas Sarkozy in 2004
when he was President of the Hauts-de-Seine’s General
Council, the project became bogged down in litigation
when competitors challenged the €59 million subsidy
as a violation of the EU’s prohibition of state aid. The
EU rejected these challenges in September 2009 and
September 2013, and the project was finally permitted
to proceed.
The French government continued to endorse FTTP in
its public pronouncements. In February 2010,
President Sarkozy announced France’s “National
Investment Program,” which promised €4.5 billion for
the digital economy including €2 billion to promote
FTTP. The government set the goal of providing 70% of
the French population with access to fiber by 2020 and
100% by 2025. The estimated cost was around €25–
€30 billion. Because of the lack of political support,
these funds were never allocated.
In February 2013, shortly after the European Union
announced that it was reducing its Connecting Europe
Facility from €9 billion to €1 billion, President Holland
committed €3 billion in public funding (with an addi-
tional €3 billion to come from local governments) and
€20 billion in public loans to provide 30 Mbps service
to the entire country by 2022 and half the country by
2017, with FTTP being the primary means for doing so.
Government officials continued to assert that FTTP rep-
resented the best technology for the future.
The companies have signaled some degree of commit-
ment to FTTP. For example, in 2010, Orange resumed
fiber deployments in several cities and in July 2011
announced that it would move outside what the French
government has classified as “very dense areas,”
spending €2 billion to cover 60% of French households
by 2020. Orange reaffirmed that commitment in 2013.
New entrant Free began offering service in 2008,
although many regard its efforts at providing FTTH to be
somewhat disappointing. In addition, Orange, Free, and
SFR entered into agreements in 2011 to share FTTH
infrastructure in low-density areas.
Unfortunately, the rhetoric far outstripped actual per-
formance. Despite the ambitious plans, to date French
FTTP coverage remains quite disappointing. Given the
high cost of FTTP and the needs to extend coverage to
more French citizens, Orange has already signaled its
preference for shifting away from an FTTP-oriented strat-
egy, and industry analysts predict that the financial
realities make such a shift quite likely. ARCEP’s FTTDP
consultation may ultimately prove to be the means for
effecting a change in emphasis away from FTTP.
LTE
French deployment of LTE has also lagged well behind
the rest of Europe. French LTE coverage was 0% in
2011 and 6% in 2012. This falls far short of the EU
benchmarks of 8% and 27 % and the U.S. benchmarks
of 68% and 86%. French rural LTE coverage was nonex-
istent at 0% in both 2011 and 2012. 
The reasons for the late deployment of LTE in France
are myriad. As an initial matter, France did not allocate
the 2.6 GHz spectrum until September 2011, which
was later than countries that achieved higher LTE pene-
tration. Even more problematic is the relatively limited
coverage of French providers’ third-generation HSPA+
networks. Only the second leading provider, Vivendi-
owned SFR, has nearly global coverage at 98% of the
population. In contrast, the HSPA+ coverage of market
leader Orange was only 60% as of the end of 2012.
This legacy of top-down planning caused
French telephone coverage lagged
behind the rest of Europe well into the
1970s and is reflected in the well-
known state-run Internet forerunner
known as Minitel.
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Bouygues, was even lower at 50%. As a result, the mar-
ket leaders initially placed greater emphasis on
upgrading their third-generation networks than on build-
ing out LTE. 
As a result, French providers did not initiate LTE trials
until June 2012, and Orange and SFR did not offer com-
mercial LTE service until November 2012. Although
Bouygues did not enter until October 2013, several
months after the market leaders, it offered the greatest
coverage, due in part to the French regulator’s March
2013 decision to allow Bouygues to reallocate its 1.8
GHz spectrum designated for GSM to LTE so long as it
divested part of that spectrum to new entrants. As a
result, Bouygues covered 63% of the population as of
its October 2013 launch and claimed 69% coverage as
of March 2014. Neither Orange nor SFR have requested
permission to refarm their 1.8 GHz spectrum, opting
instead to operate LTE exclusively in the 2.6 GHz band.
As a result, the LTE coverage provided by both compa-
nies is more limited than Bouygues’s, with each carrier
covering only 40% of the population as of the end of
2013. Bouygues’s strategy also benefits from the fact
that the iPhone operates in the 1.8 GHz band and does
not support service in the 2.6 GHz band. Bouyges also
plans to launch LTE Advanced in June 2014.
Free Mobile launched its long awaited LTE service in
the 2.6 GHz band in December 2013. Free Mobile’s
coverage remains more limited, although the company
has not yet revealed any specific statistics about the
extent of its network coverage. Free Mobile does com-
pete aggressively on price, including LTE service in its
existing 3G plans without any additional charge.
Orange and SFR have begun experimenting with LTE
Advanced, which would allow them to combine spec-
trum across multiple bands.
In December 2012, the government auctioned the 800
MHz portion of the digital dividend. Each 800 MHz
licensee was subject to an obligation to cover 98% of
the population in mainland France within 12 years from
license issued, and 99%+ within 15 years. In this auc-
tion, only three of the country’s operators acquired
spectrum, Free failed to win any blocks at all. Instead,
it was given the option of sharing SFR’s network.
The market is still undergoing change. In April 2014,
Numericable won a bidding war with Bouygues to
acquire SFR. In the aftermath, Bouygues and Free are
rumored to be in merger negotiations.
*  *  *
On close analysis, claims about France as a leader in
Internet service do not hold up. NGA coverage is lan-
guishing at half the EU rate and well behind the U.S.
Rural NGA and LTE coverage are virtually nonexistent.
These poor results undermine claims that the French
approach that centers on strong government interven-
tion and mandated infrastructure sharing and
emphasizes FTTP is something that should be emu-
lated. Indeed, ARCEP’s recent approval of VDSL and
ongoing proceeding on VDSL2 may indicate that France
may be preparing to place less emphasis on FTTP and
more emphasis on VDSL.
4.1.3 Italy
The third study country with weak facilities-based com-
petition from cable is Italy. Italy is one of the largest
countries in Europe, with a high level of urbanization
and per capita GDP in line with the rest of Europe. It
was also an early leader in deploying FTTP. 
That said, Italy’s NGA deployment is disappointing, with
only 11% NGA coverage in 2011 and 14% NGA cover-
age in 2012 despite the country’s early leadership
position in FTTP. These NGA coverage rates are by far
the worst in Europe and far below the EU benchmarks
of 48% and 54% and U.S. coverage rates of 73% and
82%. Rural NGA coverage rates are 0% for both 2011
and 2012, far below EU rates of 9% and 12% and U.S.
rates of 38% and 48%. Subscription prices are also
high, and download speeds and total bandwidth con-
sumption are low.
The government’s efforts to promote broadband cover-
age have been largely unsuccessful. For example, in
March 2003, the government established a “Program
for the Development of Broadband in the South” allo-
cating €2 billion over a five-year period to close the
existing gap in broadband infrastructure between the
north and south of Italy. By August 2013, the company
… Italy’s NGA deployment is disappointing,
… despite the country’s early leadership
position in FTTP.
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charged with overseeing these funds had invested only
€329 million.
Similarly, in 2009, the Italian Ministry for the
Economic Development (MISE) developed a “National
Broadband Plan” aimed at providing the entire Italian
population the opportunity to access broadband serv-
ice providing download speeds of at least 2 Mbps by
the end of 2013. The total budget for period 2009–
2012 was initially set for €1.5 billion, but was later
cut to €1.1 billion.
Finally, in 2012, the Italian Government defined the
Italian Digital Agenda (Agenda Digitale Italiana – ADI),
translating the goals identified by the Digital Agenda for
Europe to the national level. With regards to NGA, the
Strategic Project for Ultra-broadband (Piano Strategico
Banda Ultralarga) was intended to help Italy to achieve
the European objective of broadband coverage at a
speed of not less than 30 Mbps with at least 50% of
households having access to broadband at a speed of
at least 100 Mbps by 2020. The first step aimed to
bring ultrabroadband to the 15 biggest Italian cities
(roughly 17% of the population) within 5 years, investing
about €2.5 billion. The second step focused on cover-
ing all cities with more than 20,000 people (roughly
50% of the population) at a cost of about €8.5 billion. 
These investments would receive both public and pri-
vate financing, with public interventions initially focused
on those areas of market failure in the southern
regions of Italy where current providers have found
service to be uneconomical (Basilicata, Calabria,
Campania, Molise, Sicily), although other regions could
participate in 2014–2020. The Italian Cohesion Action
Plan (Piano Azione Coesione – PAC), organized in con-
junction with the European Commission in 2011, has
directed €383 million in funding (co-financed by the
EU) towards this end.
Italian regions and autonomous provinces play a cen-
tral role in achieving the objectives set out in the Digital
Agenda. Almost all have initiated plans to ensure wider
8 Mbps coverage, usually integrated by agreements
with the Ministry of Economic Development. For exam-
ple, in 2011 Lombardy planned to deploy
ultra-broadband networks to cover 50% of its popula-
tion, investing €1.1–€1.5 billion within 5–7 years,
while Trentino Alto Adige already bridged the digital
divide before the end of 2013.
In early 2013, the Ministry of Economic Development
announced its intent to launch three calls for tenders,
for a total of €900 million (including €237 million in
private co-financing) in order to fulfill the objectives of
the Broadband Action Plan and the first phase of the
Strategic Project for Ultra-broadband. 
VDSL
Italian VDSL coverage has been very low, reaching 0%
of Italian households in 2011, rising to 5% in 2012,
well below the EU benchmarks of 19% and 25%. Signs
Total Rural DOCSIS VDSL FTTP LTE Pct. DSL
NGA NGA 3 cable shared
Italy 14% 0% 0% 5% 12% 17% 47%
Europe 54% 12% 39% 25% 12% 27% 46%
U.S. 82% 48% 81% 10% 23% 86% n/a
Investment Price Avg. Bandwidth Rural Population GDP
per HH 12-30 speed per user HHs density per
Mbps Mbps capita
Italy $291 $34.96 4.0 12 13% 198 101
Europe $244 $27.64 5.7 18 15% 116 100
U.S. $562 $28.76 7.4 27 19% 34 152
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32 indicate, however, that VDSL may be becoming the cen-
terpiece of Italian broadband strategy.
Although Italian companies initially showed interest in
FTTP, their focus in recent years has shifted to VDSL. As
discussed in greater detail below, new entrant Fastweb
abandoned FTTH in favor of a VDSL-based strategy in
2005. Telecom Italia experimented with VDSL2 as early
as 2007 and conducted trials through a service known
as Alice Phibra. 
Moreover, in February 2012, following the collapse of
the 2010 proposal for FTTH infrastructure sharing
advanced by FTTH pioneer Fastweb, Vodafone, and
Wind, Telecom Italia and Fastweb announced a collabo-
ration to use VDSL2 as the last segment in an FTTC
architecture. The project sought to provide 100 cities
(20% of the population) with theoretical download
speeds of 400 Mbps by 2014. 
In September 2012, Fastweb announced its commit-
ment to expanding NGA access by investing an
additional €400 million in VDSL infrastructure, which is
expected to extend 100 Mbps service to 20% (5.5 mil-
lion) of Italian homes and firms by the end of 2014. In
March 2013, Fastweb launched its VDSL service,
extending its VDSL network to 1.5 million homes and
enterprises in 14 cities.
In December 2012 Telecom Italia began offering Ultra
Internet Fibra Ottica at 30 Mbps in three cities: Rome,
Turin, and Naples. In June 2013, Telecom Italia
obtained regulatory approval to launch VDSL2 nation-
wide, targeting 6.1 million homes in 100 cities by
2014. All of Telecom Italia’s recent corporate presenta-
tions confirm that its primary focus is now on VDSL.
DOCSIS 3
In Italy, DOCSIS 3 is nonexistent, covering 0% of the
country in both 2011 and 2012. This is necessarily
well below the EU benchmarks of 37% and 39% and
the U.S. benchmarks of 72% and 81%. 
The total absence of cable television is the result of
two statutes:  a 1936 fascist-era postal statute
requiring authorization of the state before anyone can
conduct wire-based communications and a 1954
enactment giving public broadcaster RAI (Radio
Audizioni Italiane) a monopoly over television broad-
casting. The success of cable television in other
countries during the 1970s prompted some private
entrepreneurs to test the limits of these restrictions.
Noting that RAI’s monopoly extended only to broad-
cast television and that the postal law did not
mention cable television specifically, these entrepre-
neurs created local cable operations. The
government regarded these systems as a threat to
public television and in 1973 formally extended RAI’s
monopoly to all forms of television regardless of the
means of transmission. The Italian Constitutional
Court declared that action unconstitutional the follow-
ing year.
Even though the court decision legalized cable, cable
operators were still subject to strict and onerous obli-
gations, such as being limited to a single urban area
unless the served population was less than 150,000
inhabitants. More importantly, each cable system
infrastructure could carry only one channel from the
same broadcaster. These regulations limited cable
operators’ ability to compete with over-the-air broad-
casters. Thus, when television services were fully
liberalized at local and national level during the
1980s, the Italian cable infrastructure had still not
yet developed.
In 1995, Telecom Italia launched Project Socrates
(Progretto Socrate), which was intended to bring a
hybrid fiber coaxial network to 19 Italian cities at a
cost of 13 trillion lire (~$8 billion), of which only 5 tril-
lion lire (~$3 billion) was actually spent to cover
roughly 2 million homes. The program was aban-
doned in 1997 due to prohibitive cost, concerns
about permitting Telecom Italia to establish what
would amount to a monopoly over multichannel video,
and a change in leadership following the privatization
of Telecom Italia. 
The absence of cable encouraged the Italian govern-
ment to use the digital video transition to experiment
with an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to generate a
broadband alternative to ADSL. Rather than turning to
FTTP or cable broadband, the government attempted
to promote Digital Video Broadcasting-Terrestrial (DVB-
T) as a platform for distributing text, news, weather,
text messaging, and other interactive services. The
Italian VDSL coverage has been very low,
reaching 0% of Italian households in
2011, rising to 5% in 2012, well below
the EU benchmarks of 19% and 25%.
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by means of DVB-T, which it called “t-government.”  It
also provided a €220 million subsidy in 2004 and
2005 for the set-top boxes needed for DVB-T. 
The effort was largely unsuccessful. Ten years later, t-
government services still had not yet appeared, and
Italians used DVB-T only to watch television, with the
only pay-per-view and interactive services being
offered by Mediaset, controlled by the family of Prime
Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Decoders with a smart-card
slot for interactive services were eligible for grants.
However, the European Commission, the General
Court of the European Union, and the Court of Justice
of the European Union ruled that the government
grants to subsidize the purchase of these DVB-T
decoder boxes constituted unlawful state aid. This
dalliance with DVB-T further forestalled the possibility
that cable networks would emerge as an alternative
source of NGA.
FTTP
Italy was an earlier leader in FTTP, having begun to
deploy FTTP during the 1990s. The country would soon
abandon this strategy, and its initial advantage eroded
over time. As of 2011, Italy’s 11% national FTTP cover-
age only slightly exceeded the 10% coverage levels of
the overall EU. By 2012, Italy’s 11.8% coverage rates
slightly trailed the EU coverage rate of 12.3%. As with
other technologies, Italy’s rural coverage remained at
0% as of the end of 2012.
The leading Italian FTTP pioneer was Fastweb. In 1999,
Fastweb began providing FTTP in Milan, utilizing some
of the resources initially built for Project Socrates. The
initial plan was to spend $6 billion to build a nation-
wide FTTP network, with a primary emphasis on
business customers. By 2002, Fastweb finished the
buildout of Milan and began operations in Rome,
Genoa, Turin, Naples, and Bologna. After offering FTTP
to 2 million homes (representing 10% of the Italian
population) and years of unprofitable operations, the
company pared back its buildout plans, limiting its fiber
rollout to these six large cities and relying on ADSL
service provided through local loop unbundling to serve
the rest of the country.
In 2005, Fastweb entered a new expansion phase,
backed by €800 million in new capital. The new plan
sought to reach 10 million homes or 45% of the
Italian population not through FTTP, but rather through
a less ambitious VDSL strategy based on fiber-to-the-
street-cabinet (FTTS) based on subloop unbundling.
Thus, only the 2 million homes representing 10% of
the Italian population that Fastweb served during the
first phase are served by FTTP. In 2007, Swisscom
acquired 82% of Fastweb and acquired the remaining
shares in November 2010, after which it took the
company private. 
In May 2010, Fastweb exhibited renewed interest in
FTTP when it joined Vodafone and Wind in submitting
a proposal that would have devoted €2.5 billion ($3
billion) to create a shared FTTP network in 15 Italian
cities. Telecom Italia countered with a €7 billion ($9
billion) plan to extend FTTP to six cities by end of
2010 and expand it to 13 cities by the end of 2012
and 138 cities (50% of the population) by 2018.
Fastweb and its partners withdrew their proposal the
following September after Telecom Italia’s repeated
disavowals of any interest in participating in a
shared FTTP infrastructure and because of its belief
that the advisory committee created by the Italian
regulator (AGCOM) to facilitate NGA deployments
was favoring the incumbent. Telecom Italia also did
not proceed with its plans. Fastweb’s subsequent
expansion plans to cover 50% of the Italian popula-
tion have been based on FTTS. Even with the
advantage of obtaining resources from Project
Socrates at a discount, Fastweb has operated at a
loss every year except for one.
At the present, an FTTH network covering 50% of the
Italian population is expected to require capital
expenditures of no less than €13 billion. Telecom
Italia has begun to show renewed interest in FTTP, but
only on a limited basis. In January 2012, it received
regulatory approval to begin deploying FTTP subject to
certain conditions. Specifically, in cities where a com-
peting FTTP exists, Telecom Italia must limit its
operations to 40,000 subscribers and must offer
competitors access to its network on an unbundled
or wholesale basis. The company rolled out FTTH in
At the present, an FTTH network covering
50% of the Italian population is expected
to require capital expenditures of no
less than €13 billion.
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and scheduled to reach 564,000 homes by 2015. In
November 2013, Telecom Italia announced a strate-
gic action plan for 2014 to 2016, committing €1.8
billion for FTTP. This minor investment is widely
regarded as a token gesture towards FTTP, and the
major providers remain focused primarily on VDSL. In
May 2012, the Fondo Strategico Italiano (Italian
Strategic Fund) announced that it would invest in up
to €500 million in FTTP provider Metroweb to bring
FTTP to the thirty largest Italian cities. In the mean-
time, the ambitious FTTH projects launched by
regional governments, such as the one in Lombardy,
appear to have ground to a halt.
Thus, even though Italy was once an FTTP leader and
has long favored FTTP over VDSL, it appears to be
shifting towards emphasizing VDSL. The low current
levels of NGA coverage argues strongly in favor of
such a move.
LTE
Italy’s deployment of LTE began relatively late, but
coverage substantially improved during 2012. LTE
coverage was 0% as of the end of 2011, but reached
17% by the end of 2012. This impressive achieve-
ment closed the gap with EU benchmarks of 8% and
27%, but still trailed U.S. benchmarks of 68% and
86%. Rural LTE coverage remained at 0%, however.
Italy completed its 4G auction in September 2011,
encompassing both the 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz spec-
trum as well as spectrum in the 1.8 GHz band. (A
block in the 2.0 GHz band failed to sell.)  Vodafone
began offering LTE service in the 1.8 GHz in October
2012, followed by Telecom Italia Mobile and 3 Italy in
November 2012.
Italy’s LTE coverage has improved still further since
the end of 2012. Telecom Italia Mobile’s LTE network
now covers 384 municipalities, representing 41% of
the population. Vodafone’s network is more limited,
covering only 46 of the most important Italian cities
and tourist locations. Both companies intend to
cover 90% of the population in 2017, and Telecom
Italia Mobile aims at reaching 60% of the population
by the end of 2014. 3 Italia currently covers only
Rome and Milan, but has the goal of covering all of
the provincial capitals by the end of 2014. Wind is
lagging even farther behind, as its 4G network only
covers some areas of Rome and Milan.
*  *  *
All in all, despite promising early efforts in FTTP,
Italian broadband policy must be considered some-
thing of a disappointment. As far as January 2014,
the objective of ensuring that all Italian citizens had
access to standard broadband by the end of 2013
was not achieved. Indeed, standard broadband
(defined as 144 kbps) was available in only 91% of
rural areas. NGA coverage has lagged even farther
behind. Hopefully, the Italian government’s most
recent subsidy program will help close the gap.
On a more general note, countries that relied on FTTP
in the absence of strong cable competition appear to
have performed worse than Europe as a whole. The
weak performance of these countries on key metrics
raises serious questions as to whether the reputa-
tions that Sweden and France enjoy as Internet
leaders are fully deserved. 
Moreover, both Italy and France appear to be consid-
ering shifting focus away from FTTP and towards
VDSL as a more cost-effective way to achieve the
Digital Agenda goals established by the European
Commission. One industry analyst usefully frames
the decision between VDSL and FTTP as a choice
between speed and coverage:  “Is it better to provide
75–100 Mbps to 80–90 percent of the population or
1 Gbps to 10–20 percent of the population?
Especially when that 10–20 percent is already enjoy-
ing faster speeds than the rest” (Broadband Trends
2013).
This is not to say that FTTP does not have an impor-
tant role in a broadband deployment strategy. Where
new infrastructure is being deployed, FTTP represents
the best long-term option. These results do suggest
that VDSL and DOCSIS 3 also play important roles,
either as bridge technologies that allow fiber to be
deployed ever deeper into the network or as ways to
serve rural areas that lack sufficient population den-
sity to support FTTP. In short, rather than favoring any
one technology, as France did when promoting FTTP
to the exclusion of VDSL, these data suggest that
policymakers should seriously consider a balanced
strategy that takes the unique legacy and circum-
stances of each country into account.
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354.2 Strong Competition from Cable and 
FTTP over VDSL
Two other countries whose telephone companies also
pursued FTTP over VDSL strategies faced strong com-
petition from cable broadband. Both of these countries
exhibited NGA coverage levels that exceeded that of
the EU. They were also characterized by DSL sharing
levels that fell below EU averages, underscoring the
importance of facilities-based competition over 
service-based competition.
4.2.1 Denmark
Denmark represents an NGA success story, unde-
servedly overshadowed by its more celebrated
neighbor to the north. NGA coverage reached 62% in
2011 and 73% in 2012, well above the EU bench-
marks of 48% and 53%, but slightly below the U.S.
benchmarks of 72% and 81%. In addition, Denmark
enjoyed strong LTE coverage of 54% in 2011 and
61% in 2012, significantly higher than the EU cover-
age levels of 8% and 27%, although again short of
U.S. coverage levels of 68% and 86%. Denmark also
enjoyed strong download speeds, low prices, and
healthy investment rates. 
The only blemish is with respect to rural NGA cover-
age, which languished at 0% in 2011 and 3% in
2012, below EU levels of 9% and 12% and well
behind U.S. levels of 38% and 48%. Despite the
strong nationwide coverage levels for LTE, rural LTE
coverage was only 1% in 2011 and 2% in 2012.
Denmark also has an unusual market structure in
that the incumbent telephone provider is also the
owner of the leading cable provider, a situation that
was rectified in other countries. Denmark is also the
only country in the study to see a new entrant to
become the market leader in FTTP instead of the
incumbent. Aside from some early support for cable
and some minor initiatives in municipal broadband,
Denmark has largely eschewed public subsidies.
VDSL
VDSL covered only 2% of the country in 2011, before
surging to 21% in 2012, reaching levels close to the EU
benchmark of 25%. Rural VDSL service was 0% in both
years, in contrast to the 3% and 5% coverage achieved
in the EU as a whole.
Total Rural DOCSIS VDSL FTTP LTE Pct. DSL
NGA NGA 3 cable shared
Denmark 73% 3% 61% 21% 43% 65% 25%
Europe 54% 12% 39% 25% 12% 27% 46%
U.S. 82% 48% 81% 10% 23% 86% n/a
Investment Price Avg. Bandwidth Rural Population GDP
per HH 12-30 speed per user HHs density per
Mbps Mbps capita
Denmark $457 $23.40 7.0 n/a 17% 130 126
Europe $244 $27.64 5.7 18 15% 116 100
U.S. $562 $28.76 7.4 27 19% 34 152
Aside from some early support for cable
and some minor initiatives in municipal
broadband, Denmark has largely
eschewed public subsidies.
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36 As was the case in most European countries, tele-
phone service in Denmark began as a state-owned
monopoly, but unlike many other countries, the initial
providers were small regional telephone companies
instead of a national PTT. In 1990, the Danish
Parliament enacted legislation authorizing these small
regional companies to merge in order to help compete
against other international telecommunications
providers. A holding company known as Tele Danmark
(later known as TDC) acquired these companies and
consolidated their operations in 1995. The government
began the process of privatizing TDC in 1994, and the
company became completely private in 1998. TDC was
subsequently acquired by a series of private equity
firms, although that does not seem to have adversely
affected the company’s willingness to invest.
TDC was not the first provider to deploy DSL, largely out
of concern that DSL would cannibalize TDC’s ISDN busi-
ness. Instead, DSL was first offered by a new entrant
known as Cybercity in 1999, which was later acquired
by Telenor, establishing a recurring pattern in Danish
telecommunications. TDC soon followed in 2000, and
soon three roughly evenly sized companies shared the
market. Over time, TDC became the dominant DSL
provider, in no small part from its practice of acquiring
companies that successfully employed local loop
unbundling to establish service (such as Fullrate and
A+ in 2010). As of the end of 2012, TDC controlled
74% of the DSL market, well above the levels of the
typical European incumbents and only trailing the levels
of the incumbents in Cyprus and Luxembourg. 
TDC’s only significant competitors are Telenor, the
Norwegian incumbent, and Telia Sonera, the company
formed by the merger of the Swedish and Finnish
incumbents. Neither provider owns any copper infra-
structure, and both appear to be focusing more on wire-
less broadband than on competing for fixed-line
customers.
The fact that TDC provided both DSL and cable modem
service appears to have led it to emphasize cable
modem service over both VDSL and FTTP. Indeed, in
2009, it stopped marketing its 50 Mbps VDSL service
in favor of a triple-play service based around its 20
Mbps cable product. In recent years, TDC has begun to
show greater interest in VDSL, emphasizing the poten-
tial of vectoring and remote DSLAMs in its annual
reports. In addition, because vectoring is inconsistent
with unbundling, the Danish regulator relieved TDC of
unbundling obligations in areas where it has upgraded
its VDSL network to use vectoring, opting instead for a
wholesale access requirement.
DOCSIS
DOCSIS 3 contributed more than any other technology
to Denmark’s strong NGA coverage. DOCSIS 3 was
available in 54% of Danish households in 2011 and
61% of Danish households in 2012. These coverage
levels were significantly higher than the EU bench-
marks of 37% and 39%, but below U.S. benchmarks
of 72% and 81%. In rural areas, however, Danish DOC-
SIS 3 coverage was a disappointing 0% in both 2011
and 2012, trailing EU rural coverage levels of 4% and
6% and well behind U.S. rural coverage levels of 37%
and 40%.
Although there were some early experiments with
cable television during the late 1950s and 1960s, the
industry did not take off as a technology until 1985,
when the government authorized the four then-
regional telephone companies to enter the cable
market and provided some funding to enable them to
do so. The goal was to form a hybrid network that
would provide radio and video programming to private
households as well as high-speed data to private com-
panies and public institutions. 
As a platform for distributing video programming, the
initiative was a rousing success, with Denmark enjoying
the highest level of cable television subscribership in
the world. As a platform for high-speed data, the hybrid
network was essentially a failure. When TDC integrated
the regional companies into a single operation in
1995, it shut down the hybrid network and integrated it
into a single national cable television network known
as Tele Danmark Kabel TV. Even after NTC acquired
Although there were some early 
experiments with cable television during
the late 1950s and 1960s, the industry did
not take off as a technology until 1985,
when the government authorized the four
then-regional telephone companies to
enter the cable market and provided some
funding to enable them to do so.
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37TDC in 2005, it continued to operate TDC Kabel TV as
a separate company and renamed it YouSee in 2007 to
emphasize its independence. 
TDC remains the largest cable television operator, offer-
ing service to 1.5 million (56%) of Danish households
and providing service to 1.2 million (46%) Danish
households. Stofa is the second largest provider of
cable, with 414,000 subscribers as of 2011. Stofa’s
service area focuses on Jutland and Funen. The lack of
overlap with TDC’s cable network means that for the
most part the two companies do not compete directly.
Stofa, which was acquired by Telia in 1995, first offered
cable modem service in 1996. TDC began providing
broadband service in 1999, half a year after ADSL. By
2003, most of the cable infrastructure was upgraded to
provide broadband services. Cable modem service is
now available in 63% of Danish households, with the
vast majority (62% of households) having already been
upgraded to DOCSIS 3. Interestingly, in 2012, Stofa
was acquired by energy company Syd Energi (SE), which
is also a major provider of FTTP.
One of the most striking aspects of Danish broadband
is that the telephone system and the cable system are
both owned by TDC, which controls 74% of the DSL
market and 66% of the cable modem market. This led
the Danish NRA in 2009 to order TDC to open its cable
broadband infrastructure to other operators. As a gen-
eral matter, the European Commission does not
recommend including fiber and cable broadband net-
works in the definition of the market for broadband
access (market 5). Danish telecommunications legisla-
tion does not distinguish between different types of
fixed communication networks, however, and thus
applies equally to copper, cable, and optical networks.
Although eleven other EU countries include cable
modem service in the market for broadband access,
Denmark is the only country to mandate access to
cable broadband systems, although to date no provider
has attempted to utilize this right.
FTTP
Denmark also enjoys strong FTTP coverage. As of
2011, FTTP was available in 37% of Danish homes,
well over the 10% coverage rate for the EU as a whole
and the 17% coverage rate for the U.S. By 2012,
Danish FTTP coverage had risen to 43%, well above the
EU coverage rate of 27% and the U.S. coverage rate of
23%. Rural FTTP coverage rates were disappointing in
Denmark, however, registering at 0% in 2011 and 3% in
2012, which was in line with EU rates, but below U.S.
rates of 6% and 8%.
In contrast to other countries that have emphasized
fiber, the incumbent TDC has shown little interest in
pursuing FTTP.  Its annual reports instead emphasize
increasing the capacity and speed of its cable modem
product and improving DSL through vectoring and mak-
ing greater use of remote DSLAMs to deploy fiber
closer to the home. TDC’s November 2009 acquisition
of DONG Energy and its 15,000 FTTP customers raised
the possibility that it might be preparing to place
greater emphasis on FTTP.  Subsequent press reports
do not find that the acquisition effected any change in
TDC’s approach.
Instead, the Danish FTTP market is dominated by
regional energy companies. Since 2000, energy compa-
nies have invested heavily in fiber networks, and their
networks now pass 700,000 households. The most
important player among the electricity companies is
Syd Energi (SE), the electricity provider in South
Jutland. This region is one of the least densely popu-
lated regions in Denmark, but due to SE, it nonetheless
enjoys the best FTTP coverage in the nation. As noted
above, in 2012, SE acquired Stofa, Denmark’s second
largest cable company and the only cable provider in
Jutland. In addition, in September 2010, fourteen
energy companies formed Waoo! in order to promote
broadband via FTTP. 
Unfortunately, these energy companies’ large invest-
ments in FTTP have not been financially successful,
losing DKK 5.3 billion (€700 million) on these activi-
ties through 2012. As a result, the energy companies
have scaled back further investments in the aftermath
In contrast to other countries that have
emphasized fiber, the incumbent TDC has
shown little interest in pursuing FTTP. 
Its annual reports instead emphasize
increasing the capacity and speed of its
cable modem product and improving
DSL through vectoring and making
greater use of remote DSLAMs to 
deploy fiber closer to the home.
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38 of the 2008 economic downturn and have focused
instead on connecting more customers to the existing
infrastructure.
Thus, Denmark’s strong FTTP coverage is the product of
private investment by a facilities-based entrant, in stark
contrast to the government subsidies used in Sweden.
Unfortunately, to date the financial performance of
these services has been disappointing. Even so, since
June 2011, TDC has received some requests to open
its FTTP network to other operators and service
providers. Any household within 30 meters of TDC’s
optical network can request access regardless of
whether they are a TDC customer or not. The costs of
connection, which are estimated to be around €2,000,
must be borne by TDC even if the customer wants to
subscribe to a competing operator.
LTE
Denmark is one of the stronger LTE countries in
Europe, achieving 54% national coverage by the end
of 2011 and 65% national coverage by the end of
2012, well ahead of the EU levels of 8% and 27%
respectively, but behind the U.S. levels of 68% and
86%. Rural coverage has been more disappointing,
with LTE reaching only 1% of Danish rural households
by the end of 2011 and 2% of Danish rural house-
holds by the end of 2012, as compared with EU
coverage levels of 5% and 10%.
Denmark completed its auction of the 2.6 GHz on May
6, 2010, which among the countries studied in this
study trailed only Sweden. The early 2.6 GHz auctions
permitted Denmark to enjoy the widespread early
deployment of LTE. Telia launched LTE service in
December 2010, relying on the 2.6 GHz band and
reaching 75% coverage by May 2013. TDC launched
LTE in October 2011, again relying on the 2.6 GHz
band. TDC’s LTE network covered 40% of the Danish
population by the end of 2012 and is forecast to cover
99% of the population by the end of 2015.
In addition, the Danish regulator, the National IT and
Telecom Agency (NITA), decided in December 2009 to
permit providers to reallocate 900 MHz and 1.8 GHz
spectrum from GSM to LTE. NITA did so notwithstand-
ing the EU’s initial preference for deploying LTE in the
800 MHz spectrum or in the 2.6 GHz flexible spectrum,
although in 2011 the EU directed member states to
permit LTE operations in the 1.8 GHz spectrum in an
attempt to promote roaming through harmonization.
NITA did require Telia to divest spectrum in both bands
and also required TDC to reduce its spectrum holdings
in the 1.8 GHz band. The recovered spectrum was
refarmed into a 2x5 MHz block in the 900 spectrum
and a 2x10 MHz block in the 1.8 GHz spectrum. In
October 2010, these blocks were sold at an auction at
which incumbents were not allowed to bid and at which
3 Denmark was the only participant.
In June 2011, Telia and Norwegian incumbent Telenor
entered into an infrastructure-sharing joint venture
called TT-Netværket, which was approved by Danish
regulators in March 2012. The flexibility provided by the
Danish regulator to provide LTE service in the 1.8 GHz
band permitted Telenor to use the TT-Netværket infra-
structure to launch LTE service in Denmark in March
2013. Moreover, at launch, Telenor was able to cover
75% of the Danish population, which allowed it to
leapfrog over the coverage provided by TDC. Telia was
also able to expand its LTE service to include both the
1.8 GHz and 2.6 GHz bands.
In June 2012, Denmark allocated more spectrum to
LTE when it completed its digital dividend auction of
800 MHz spectrum. TDC acquired a 2x20 MHz
license, which is widely regarded as the optimal block
size for implementing LTE. TT-Netværket acquired
2x10 MHz licenses which can used to reach an esti-
mated 98% of the population. These licenses carry no
rural coverage requirements, although they are subject
to tower-siting restrictions to prevent interference with
television broadcasting. Both 800 MHz licensees
must cover 99% of the Danish population with 10
Mbps service. 
Denmark’s fourth wireless provider, 3 Denmark, missed
out in its bid for 800 MHz spectrum. However, in
September 2012, it launched its 4G network across fif-
teen of Denmark’s largest cities, covering 38% of the
population using a combination of 1.8 GHz and 2.6
The fact that the 7% increase in DOCSIS
3 coverage and the 6% increase in FTTP
coverage both contributed to the 11%
increase in NGA coverage suggests that
the bulk of these investments do not
overlap and thus are not driven by 
competitive forces.
COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
39GHz spectrum at launch and later expanding its cover-
age to 75% of the population by the end of 2013.
Because Apple’s iPhone 5 LTE operates only in the 1.8
GHz band, it is compatible with Telia, Telenor and 3
Denmark, but not TDC.
*  *  *
The precise bases for Denmark’s success are hard to
unravel. On the one hand, the fact that the incumbent
telephone company was also the leading cable broad-
band provider undercuts the traditional story of
facilities-based competition between cable and DSL.
On the other hand, the presence of vibrant FTTP-based
entry by energy companies raises the possibility of
facilities-based competition between cable and FTTP,
although to date FTTP has been unprofitable. The fact
that the 7% increase in DOCSIS 3 coverage and the 6%
increase in FTTP coverage both contributed to the 11%
increase in NGA coverage suggests that the bulk of
these investments do not overlap and thus are not
driven by competitive forces.
In any event, recent years have witnessed a fundamen-
tal change in the political discourse about broadband
policy. Debates during 2013 witnessed increasing calls
for public subsidies, as many became concerned that
private companies would not be able to meet the
increasing demand for bandwidth. These proposals did
not specify how such public funding would be financed.
4.2.2 Spain
That Spain would emerge as an above-average per-
former in terms of NGA coverage comes as something
of a surprise. Not only does Spain have a greater rural
population than is generally true in Europe; its GDP per
capita (adjusted for purchasing power parity) is slightly
below the EU average. Notwithstanding these demo-
graphic disadvantages, Spain has achieved high levels
of NGA coverage, reaching 56% of households in 2011
and 64% of households in 2012. These coverage lev-
els exceed the NGA coverage levels of 48% and 54%
for Europe as a whole, although they fall short of U.S.
coverage levels of 73% and 82%. 
Rural NGA coverage levels are also respectable by
European standards, reaching 7% in 2011 and 13%
in 2012 as compared with 9% and 12% EU-wide,
although these fall short of U.S. rural NGA coverage
of 38% and 48%. 
There are some areas for improvement, however. As of
2012, LTE coverage still languished at 0%. Prices
remain relatively high, and download speeds, band-
width usage, and investment levels remain low.
VDSL
To date, VDSL has played a minor role in supporting
Spain’s impressive NGA coverage numbers. VDSL
was available in only 11% of Spanish households in
both 2011 and 2012, well below EU coverage levels
Total Rural DOCSIS VDSL FTTP LTE Pct. DSL
NGA NGA 3 cable shared
Spain 64% 13% 50% 11% 18% 0% 41%
Europe 54% 12% 39% 25% 12% 27% 46%
U.S. 82% 48% 81% 10% 23% 86% n/a
Investment Price Avg. Bandwidth Rural Population GDP
per HH 12-30 speed per user HHs density per
Mbps Mbps capita
Spain $255 $47.11 4.9 13 18% 92 96
Europe $244 $27.64 5.7 18 15% 116 100
U.S. $562 $28.76 7.4 27 19% 34 152
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40 of 19% and 25%. Rural VDSL coverage was 0% both
years, in contrast to EU rural VDSL coverage rates of
4% and 5%.
DSL service was launched in 1999. Several new
entrants took advantage of local loop unbundling to
compete with Telefónica, with the leading DSL competi-
tors including Jazztel, Vodafone and Orange. Telefónica
launched VDSL2 in April 2008, the earliest launch of
any country included in this study. Jazztel followed suit
in April 2010, with Telefónica increasing its download
speeds from 30 Mbps to 50 Mbps in 2011 and
Vodafone launching VDSL2 in May 2013. 
The service initially failed to gain traction with sub-
scribers, but over time became an important
component of NGA coverage, although not as important
as FTTP. A study of NGA technologies by city size con-
ducted by the Spanish regulator revealed that FTTH
represented the most important NGA technology in
Madrid and Barcelona and had begun expanding in
medium-sized cities as well. DOCSIS 3 was the most
important technology in medium-sized cities. VDSL
played an important role in medium-sized cities and
has remained the most important technology in smaller
cities (CMT 2013). 
DOCSIS 3
Cable broadband has played the leading role in allow-
ing Spain to achieve its impressive NGA coverage
rates. DOCSIS 3 was available in 46% of Spanish
households in 2011 and 50% of Spanish households
in 2012, well above the EU benchmarks of 37% and
39%, but below the U.S. benchmarks of 72% and 81%.
Moreover, DOCSIS 3 was the only NGA technology in
Spain that was available in rural areas. Rural DOCSIS 3
coverage was 7% in 2011 and 13% in 2012, versus EU
coverage rates of 4% and 6% and U.S. coverage rates
of 37% and 39%. 
The progress of cable broadband is all the more
impressive in light of the fact that private television
channels did not exist until 1987 and the Spanish
cable television industry did not exist until the mid-
1990s. All of this changed in 1998, when the
government used a competitive tender process to cre-
ate thirty-seven new cable operators in different regions
of the country. The access to local capital provided by
Spanish savings banks and the regional governments’
inherent opposition to the central government helped
get these fledgling operations off the ground. Because
cable television did not develop until relatively late, they
were able to deploy modern equipment that was easy
to upgrade for more advanced services. To compete
with these new pay TV services, Telefónica created
Telefónica Cable in 1997, although regulatory and com-
mercial problems led Telefónica to focus its efforts on
ADSL and pay television through its satellite-based Via
Digital platform. 
A series of mergers in 2004 and 2005 consolidated
many of the regional cable operators into a single com-
pany called ONO, which emerged as the largest cable
operator in Spain. On March 17, 2014, ONO
announced that it was being acquired by Vodafone.
Smaller operators, such as Euskaltel (País Vasco), R
(Galicia), and Telecable (Asturias), continue to operate
on a regional level. 
Cable operators upgraded their networks in 2012 so
that 96% of all cable broadband connections belonged
to a node updated to DOCSIS 3. As of 2012, ONO con-
trolled 51% of NGA connections, and regional cable
operators controlled another 21%, although their cumu-
lative share dropped 9% from the previous year due
primarily to the growth of FTTP.
FTTP
Spanish FTTP deployments run at or slightly above the
EU average. In 2011, FTTP was available in 10% of
Spanish households in 2011 and 18% of Spanish
households in 2012. This was compared with EU cover-
age rates of 10% and 12% and U.S. coverage rates of
17% and 23%. Rural FTTP coverage remains at 0%.
Telefónica has provided FTTP since 2009, but the serv-
ice did not begin to take off until 2011. As of now, FTTP
falls outside the scope of any obligations to provide
unbundled or indirect wholesale access, although
Telefónica asserts that the overhanging threat of such
regulation deters FTTP investments.
More recently, other providers have
begun to show greater interest in FTTP.
In June 2012, Orange announced its
intention to invest €300 million to bring
FTTP to 1.5 million Spanish homes.
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41More recently, other providers have begun to show
greater interest in FTTP. In June 2012, Orange
announced its intention to invest €300 million to bring
FTTP to 1.5 million Spanish homes. The high cost of
FTTP has led providers to experiment with higher
degrees of cooperation. In October 2012, Telefónica
and Jazztel agreed each to deploy fiber to 1.5 million
households and to provide each other with reciprocal
access to the interior wiring needed to reach those cus-
tomers. Jazztel anticipates that the project will cost
€590 million, with €450 million coming from Chinese
investors and the rest from the European Investment
Bank. Orange and Vodafone reached a similar agree-
ment shortly thereafter, committing to extend FTTP to 6
million households at a cost of €1 billion. The parties
have submitted these agreements to CMT for review. 
A recent CMT study of NGA deployments based on city
size has also raised questions about FTTP’s potential
in smaller Spanish cities. Limited public funding (€333
million) is being used to support initiatives such as
Asturcon, which is designed to bring FTTP to the eco-
nomically disadvantaged principality of Asturias.
LTE
Spain got off to a late start in LTE deployments, having
0% LTE coverage as of the end of 2012 despite the
fact that it auctioned both its 800 MHz and 2.6 GHz
spectrum in July 2011. Although this satisfied the EC’s
requirement that the spectrum be allocated by January
1, 2013, Spain nonetheless invoked the exception per-
mitting states to postpone the deadline until 2015
under exceptional circumstances. Following a change in
the government in November 2011, the new adminis-
tration committed to release the digital dividend
frequencies by January 1, 2014. However, a December
2012 Supreme Court decision invalidated the new digi-
tal television channel assignments for their failure to
comply with the Audiovisual Communication General
Act. This cast doubt on whether the 800 MHz frequen-
cies would in fact be available in January 2014.
Spanish law nonetheless gave mobile providers the
flexibility to deploy LTE in other frequency plans. Rather
than wait for these issues to be resolved, mobile
providers initiated LTE service in the 1.8 and 2.6 GHz
frequency bands. By July 2013, Vodafone, Orange, and
Yoigo had deployed LTE, with Movistar following suit in
September 2013.
*  *  *
Spain’s ability to achieve such strong NGA coverage
in light of its demographic characteristics and the
weak legacy of cable television is impressive. Spain
is a good example of a country where cable made the
primary contribution to NGA coverage, but the
increase from 2011 to 2012 was driven primarily by
FTTP. The Spanish regulator has raised the possibility
that VDSL may play an important role in smaller met-
ropolitan areas.
4.3 Strong Competition from Cable and 
VDSL over FTTP
Three other countries faced strong competition from
cable, but unlike the other five countries in this study
chose to emphasize VDSL over FTTP.  All three of these
countries exceeded the EU benchmark for NGA cover-
age. Indeed, at 98% NGA coverage, the Netherlands
enjoyed the second highest level of NGA deployment in
the EU.
4.3.1 Netherlands
European broadband success stories typically do not
mention the Netherlands, but they should. Netherlands
is one of Europe’s leaders in NGA coverage, second
only to Malta. NGA was available in 97% of Dutch
households in 2011 and 98% of Dutch households in
2012. The Netherlands thus far exceeded the EU
benchmarks of 48% and 54% and was the only country
in this study to surpass the U.S. benchmarks of 73%
and 82%. Dutch rural NGA coverage was also outstand-
ing, serving 73% of Dutch homes in 2011 and 85% in
2012, well above the EU levels of 9% and 12% and
exceeding the U.S. levels of 38% and 48%. The
Netherlands also enjoys healthy investment, good
prices, and strong download speeds. The only area
where the Netherlands lags is LTE, which had not
deployed as of the end of 2012. 
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The Netherlands also enjoys healthy
investment, good prices, and strong
download speeds. The only area where
the Netherlands lags is LTE, which had
not deployed as of the end of 2012. 
42 Perhaps the Netherlands strong NGA coverage comes
as no surprise, since the Netherlands has the lowest
percentage of rural households of any country in this
study, a strong per capita GDP, and a relatively flat
topography. What is most striking is that the
Netherlands was able to achieve such high coverage
rates without significant contributions from FTTP.
Instead, competition from cable is credited in
spurring the incumbent KPN to invest in VDSL
(Analysis Mason 2013).
VDSL
VDSL played an important contributing role in promot-
ing Dutch NGA coverage. In 2011, VDSL covered 47%
of all Dutch households, and that number increased to
60% in 2012. These coverage rates far exceeded the
EU coverage rates of 19% in 2011 and 25% in 2012.
Rural VDSL rates check in at 28% both years, higher
than the EU rates of 19% and 25%.
The fixed line broadband market has long been domi-
nated by DSL technologies provided via the traditional
copper local loop of KPN. Kicked off in late 1990s,
ADSL rapidly became the market leader, surpassing
cable broadband in the early 2000s. After the introduc-
tion of ADSL, several alternative providers entered the
market using the access network of KPN.
In 2007, these parties began negotiations with KPN
about subloop unbundling to support VDSL. The leap to
VDSL and increased competition meant that KPN and
new entrant Tele2 were the only substantial facilities-
based DSL providers in the Netherlands. In August
2009, Tele2 (formerly Versatel) deployed CO-VDSL to
launch a 60 Mbps product called “Fiber Speed.”  With
this approach Tele2 expected to reach out to 1 million
households less than 1 kilometer away from the central
office by the end of 2010 and eventually reach 2 mil-
lion homes without having to incur the high cost of FTTP.
KPN initiated VDSL2 service in 2009, CO-VDSL in
2010, and VDSL-Outer Ring service in 2011. Vodafone
also launched VDSL in 2011. Like Tele2, these compa-
nies regard VDSL as a defensive strategy against cable
broadband used to postpone the need to invest in FTTP. 
DOCSIS 3
DOCSIS 3 represents the dominant NGA technology in
the Netherlands. In 2011, DOCSIS 3 was available in
97% of Dutch households, well over EU coverage levels
of 36% and even higher than the U.S. coverage level of
72%. By 2012, Dutch DOCSIS 3 coverage had inched
up to 98%, while EU coverage remained at 39% and
U.S. coverage increased to 81%. Rural DOCSIS 3 cover-
age was also quite strong at 66% in 2011 and 80% in
2012, compared with 4% and 6% in the EU and 37%
and 39% in the U.S.
The Dutch cable industry emerged during the late
1950s and 1960s as a series of community antenna
television systems, with larger systems being operated
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Total Rural DOCSIS VDSL FTTP LTE Pct. DSL
NGA NGA 3 cable shared
Netherlands 98% 85% 98% 60% 18% 0% 27%
Europe 54% 12% 39% 25% 12% 27% 46%
U.S. 82% 48% 81% 10% 23% 86% n/a
Investment Price Avg. Bandwidth Rural Population GDP
per HH 12-30 speed per user HHs density per
Mbps Mbps capita
Netherlands $450 $23.95 8.6 n/a 8% 495 128
Europe $244 $27.64 5.7 18 15% 116 100
U.S. $562 $28.76 7.4 27 19% 34 152
43as part of the PTT. In 1969, the government abandoned
plans to unify all of the cable systems under a PTT
monopoly and opted instead to license private cable
systems that gave preferential rights to the municipali-
ties. Other amendments to the telecommunications
statute permitted the incumbent telephone provider to
build cable television networks through a subsidiary
called CASEMA.
The result was that during the 1970s and 1980s, thou-
sands of small cable networks were built, financed
primarily by local municipalities, housing corporations,
or third parties often acting on behalf of municipalities
and spurred in part by these municipalities’ decisions
to bar rooftop antennas. By the mid-1990s, cable tele-
vision covered 94% of Dutch homes. Municipalities
generally divested their cable networks following the
mandate of liberalization in the late 1990s. This trig-
gered a wave of consolidation that ultimately created
two dominant, but nonoverlapping cable operators,
Ziggo and Liberty Media-owned UPC. Together these
companies serve close to 90% of all cable subscribers.
Liberty Media is in the process of acquiring Ziggo. The
transaction is subject to approval by the European com-
petition authority, which may require remedies including
access obligations.
During the merger wave of the 1990s and 2000s,
cable companies continued to invest in keeping their
networks technologically up to date, which left Dutch
cable operators well positioned to roll out broadband
Internet services. These companies first deployed
cable broadband during the late 1990s using propri-
etary technologies, but later switched to DOCSIS during
the early 2000s. These companies have subsequently
upgraded their networks to DOCSIS 3.
Despite their near universality, cable broadband net-
works are not regarded as possessing significant
market power and thus remain largely unregulated.
During a limited period of time, the regulator consid-
ered mandating access to cable facilities, but these
decisions were challenged in court and were never
implemented. Recently, the Dutch parliament intro-
duced amendments to the Telecommunications Act and
to the Media Act that would have mandated wholesale
access to the so-called “analogue basic package.”
However, these provisions have been challenged by the
European Commission. A Dutch court annulled the pro-
visions, and the Dutch government has announced that
they will withdraw the provisions. This will also end the
European case.
FTTP
Despite being one of the leading European nations in
terms of NGA coverage, Dutch FTTP coverage is surpris-
ingly pedestrian. In 2011, FTTP was available in 13% of
all Dutch households, as compared with 10% coverage
for the EU as a whole and 17% coverage for the U.S. By
2012, Dutch FTTP coverage had increased to 18%,
while EU coverage increased to 12% and U.S. coverage
had increased to 23%. Dutch rural FTTP coverage was
9% in both 2011 and 2012, compared with 0% and 3%
for the EU and 6% and 8% for the U.S. In short, Dutch
FTTP coverage is nothing more than merely solid
despite the presence of well-publicized initiatives such
as Kenniswijk and Reggefiber.
Dutch FTTP began in the early 2000s, as some munici-
palities and smaller operators began to deploy fiber
optic networks in Rotterdam and Amsterdam. In addi-
tion, in 2000, the government initiated the Kenniswijk
(smart city) project in the area around Eindhoven, which
provided €9 million in annual funding to promote the
rollout of FTTP.
Dutch FTTP deployments received a jolt in the arm in
2005 when a private investor founded Reggefiber.
Reggefiber began acquiring small-scale fiber networks,
such as a 40,000-subscriber FTTP network in
Amsterdam. The company also targeted small and mid-
sized cities for rolling out full blown FTTP. Reggefiber
leases the fiber connection on a wholesale basis to
retail service providers and does not begin construction
until at least 30% of households in the targeted area
have committed to subscribe to one of the retail serv-
ice providers. KPN acquired a 41% stake in Reggefiber
in December 2009 and increased its stake to 51% in
November 2012 and again to 60% in January 2014,
which gave it full control over Reggefiber. Approval by
the national competition authority is pending.
The Netherlands has a unique fixed line
access infrastructure. Thanks to municipal
subsidies, it is among the most densely
cabled countries in the world, which
made two fixed-line connections available
in 92% of Dutch homes.
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44 Because Reggefiber is likely to come under the full con-
trol of KPN, its FTTP networks are subject to unbundling
and wholesale access obligations. The fact that
Reggefiber’s business model is wholesale access and
the lack of alternative providers has minimized the
impact of this obligation. 
In 2008, the Communications Infrastructure Fund (CIF),
a large investment group largely supported by Dutch
pension funds, also became interested in FTTP,
although it decided to pursue a strategy that is quite
different from Reggefiber’s. CIF started to acquire the
remaining cable connections from independent cable
operators, who owned approximately 12.5% of all con-
nections, with the other connections being in the hands
of Ziggo and UPC. CIF owns an estimated 60% of these
once independent connections. After acquisition, CIF
and overbuilds their coaxial networks with FTTP. It then
upsells services to promote migration from coaxial
cable to fiber with the aim of eventually retiring the
coaxial network. Because of this strategy, CIF-based
FTTP does not face competition from cable broadband
providers. Reggefiber and CIF FTTP deployments tend
not to overbuild each other. Despite these efforts,
Dutch FTTP coverage remains quite modest, with
incumbent KPN continuing to take a balanced approach
between VDSL and FTTP.
LTE
The Netherlands was slow to deploy LTE, having 0% LTE
coverage in both 2011 and 2012. This, of course, was
well below the 2012 EU coverage rate of 27% or the
U.S. coverage rate of 86%.
The primary reason for the delay in deploying LTE is
that the Netherlands did not auction its 2.6 GHz spec-
trum until April 2010. The delay was mostly the result
of Lower House of the Dutch Parliament’s insistence
that the auction create new mobile broadband
providers by placing spectrum caps on the incumbents.
Ironically, only two new entrants entered the auction,
and some blocks did not receive any bids. The result
was a spectrum allocation that was far from optimal,
and the auction generated a disappointing €2.7 mil-
lion. Ziggo launched LTE service using its 2.6 GHz
spectrum in May 2012, but it targeted only the busi-
ness market.
A December 2012 auction allocated the 800 MHz digi-
tal dividend spectrum as well as the 900 MHz and 1.8
GHz spectrum refarmed from GSM. Although spectrum
was again set aside for newcomers, only one player
entered the wireless market, Tele2, and it in the end
decided not to build its own network but instead opted
to team up with T-Mobile. All three operators—KPN,
Vodafone and T-Mobile—were offering LTE using the
800 MHz or 1.8 GHz spectrum before the end of 2013. 
*  *  *
The Netherlands has a unique fixed line access infra-
structure. Thanks to municipal subsidies, it is among
the most densely cabled countries in the world, which
made two fixed-line connections available in 92% of
Dutch homes. Both were more or less government
financed/owned. The privatization of these networks
resulted in today’s market with strong competition
between cable television operators and the incumbent
KPN that is driving the NGA rollout. Two high-profile
FTTP ventures have garnered a fair amount of atten-
tion, but have yet to have a significant impact.
4.3.2 United Kingdom
With high levels of urbanization and a per capita GDP
that exceeded the EU average, it is perhaps unsur-
prising that the UK has exceeded EU coverage levels
for NGA. NGA in the United Kingdom reached 58% of
households in 2011 and 70% of households in
2012, which was higher than the EU levels of 48%
and 54%, but below the U.S. levels of 73% and 82%.
Rural NGA coverage registered a respectable 4% in
2011 and 18% in 2012, as compared with 9% and
12% in the EU and 38% and 48% in the U.S. LTE cov-
erage was quiet modest at 0% in 2011 and 17% in
2012, while in the EU LTE coverage was 8% and 27%
and in the U.S. LTE coverage was 68% and 86%.
Rural LTE was 0%.
The UK government has one of the most significant
public broadband subsidy programs in Europe.
Between 2003 and 2006, the government spent
more than $2 billion on building public sector net-
works. More recently, the government allocated £530
million to the Broadband Delivery UK (BDUK) to sup-
port broadband buildout by local authorities on a
technology-neutral basis, with an additional £250 mil-
lion set aside for “super connected” cities.
VDSL
British VDSL registered a sharp gain during 2012,
increasing from covering 26% of households in 2011
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for almost all of the 12% growth in NGA coverage.
This exceeded the EU rates of 19% and 25%. VDSL
was also available in 4% of rural households in the UK
during 2011 and 14% of rural households in 2012, a
substantial improvement over EU levels of 3% and 5%.
These numbers are likely to improve even more in the
near future. BT announced in April 2013 that it had
reached its target of passing 50% of UK homes with
VDSL, eighteen months ahead of schedule, and
announced in October 2013 that it reached 57% of UK
homes. BT was confident that it would reach its target
of passing 66% of UK households by spring 2014. 
The strong performance of VDSL in the UK is a direct
reflection of the business strategies being pursued by
BT. Although the company initially regarded DSL as a
short-term bridge solution until it could deploy optical
fiber, the company soon began to question the busi-
ness case for FTTP.
Instead, BT is pursuing a VDSL strategy based on
fiber-to-the-cabinet (FTTC). As BT Managing Director
Mike Galvin said in May 2012, “Our FTTC delivers
80Mbit/s downstream and 20Mbit/s upstream and
FTTH currently delivers 100Mbit/s downstream and
10Mbit/s upstream. I don’t think customers see it as
a huge step between FTTC and FTTH. There is a sub-
set of people who believe that FTTH is a pure answer
and that it is ‘engineeringly elegant’ and something
that everyone should go forward with. Our view is that
we will be led by our customers and what we think
best meets their needs” (Computing 2012).
Consequently, BT has developed an aggressive plan to
use FTTC to upgrade its DSL connections to VDSL. The
figure on the next page shows the FTTC status of each
city’s exchanges, according to BT’s current roll-out
plans. 
DOCSIS 3
DOCSIS 3 joined VDSL in playing a key role in support-
ing strong NGA coverage during both of the years
covered in this study. In 2011, DOCSIS 3 was available
in 46% of UK households, well above the 37% coverage
achieved across the EU as a whole, but below the 72%
coverage achieved in the U.S. By 2012, DOCSIS 3 
Total Rural DOCSIS VDSL FTTP LTE Pct. DSL
NGA NGA 3 cable shared
U.K. 70% 18% 48% 47% 1% 17% 61%
Europe 54% 12% 39% 25% 12% 27% 46%
U.S. 82% 48% 81% 10% 23% 86% n/a
Investment Price Avg. Bandwidth Rural Population GDP
per HH 12-30 speed per user HHs density per
Mbps Mbps capita
U.K. $215 $27.29 6.5 31 9% 259 105
Europe $244 $27.64 5.7 18 15% 116 100
U.S. $562 $28.76 7.4 27 19% 34 152
The strong performance of VDSL in the
UK is a direct reflection of the business
strategies being pursued by BT. Although
the company initially regarded DSL as 
a short-term bridge solution until it 
could deploy optical fiber, the company
soon began to question the business
case for FTTP.
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coverage had crept upwards to 48% in the UK, as com-
pared with 39% in the EU, and 82% in the U.S. Rural
DOCSIS 3 coverage remained disappointing, reaching
0% of rural UK households in 2011 and only 5% of
rural UK households in 2012, which was below the 
EU coverage rates of 4% and 6%.
Cable television emerged relatively late in the UK, but
by the late 1990s, cable television service was avail-
able in 50% of the country. A series of mergers
concentrated 90% of the industry in the hands of two
companies, NTL and Telewest, which served nonover-
lapping territories. The two companies merged with
each other in 2006 and eventually joined with Virgin
Mobile in 2006 to form a new company known as
Virgin Media. 
Cable modem service launched in 1997, three years
prior to the launch of ADSL in 2000. Technical consid-
erations limited the availability of cable modem service
to 45% of the country at the time of launch and to 48%
of the country as of 2012, in contrast to DSL, which
was available in 60% of the country by 2001 and 99%
of the country by 2006. Despite having greater band-
width and being the first to deploy, the limited
geographic reach of cable modem service caused it to
be overtaken by ADSL in 2003. 
The deployment of VDSL has caused cable modem’s
market share to stagnate. The cable industry has con-
tinued to invest in higher speeds, with the average
speed on Virgin Media’s network nearly doubled from
May 2012 to May 2013 from 18 Mbps to 34 Mbps.
FTTP
The UK’s FTTP coverage remains quite low, reaching
only 0.2% of British households in 2011 and 0.7% of
British households in 2012. Studies generally indicated
that the business case for FTTP was relatively weak
(Analysys Mason 2013). Consequently, as noted in the
discussion on VDSL, BT has prioritized VDSL over FTTP
as a matter of business strategy. That said, BT recog-
nized that FTTP may have some appeal to small and
medium sized enterprises. Thus, in July 2012, BT initi-
ated trials in a handful of central offices. Deployment
plans are limited, covering at most 25% of the country,
and as Ofcom noted (2013a, 320), the high cost of
FTTP means that its appeal will be predominantly lim-
ited to business customers. BT would not expand its
FTTP service so long as customers indicate they remain
satisfied with its 80 Mbps VDSL service. The relative
weakness of FTTP did not seem to impair the UK’s over-
all NGA coverage.
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Total Already Pct. Scheduled Cumulative
exchanges upgraded for upgrade pct.
London 208 176 84% 20 94%
Birmingham 41 16 39% 14 73
Manchester 24 21 88% 3 100%
Cambridge 7 2 29% 0 29%
Exeter 5 1 20% 0 20%
Glasgow 33 10 30% 12 67%
Inverness 3 0 0% 1 33%
Cardiff 14 10 71% 4 100%
Bangor 1 1 100% 0 100%
Belfast 15 15 100% 0 100%
Derry-Londonderry 10 10 100% 0 100%
Source:  Ofcom (2013).
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The UK got off to a late start in LTE deployments, 
having 0% LTE coverage as of the end of 2011, as 
compared with 8% in the EU and 68% in the U.S. Since
that time, UK LTE providers have made steady progress,
achieving 17% coverage by the end of 2012, as 
compared with 27% in the EU and 86% in the U.S.
Rural LTE coverage continued to be 0%.
One of the primary reasons for delay in deploying LTE
was the inability of the UK’s largest wireless providers
to agree on the design of the auction delayed comple-
tion of the digital dividend auction until February 2013.
Despite the delays, LTE did appear in the UK in February
and March 2012 courtesy of failed-WiMax provider UK
Broadband. UK Broadband used spectrum in the 3.5
and 3.6 GHz bands originally auctioned in 2003 for
fixed wireless and authorized for mobile wireless in
2007 under an alternative standard known as TD-LTE. 
Moreover, in August 2012, the UK regulator approved
EE’s plan to redeploy some of its 1.8 GHz GSM spec-
trum for LTE on the condition that it sell 25% of its
spectrum to the country’s smallest wireless operator, 3
UK. EE launched LTE service in this band in October
2012 despite the fact that the UK had not yet com-
pleted its digital dividend auction. By June 2013, EE
reached 55% of the UK population and forecast 98%
coverage by the end of 2014.
In addition, all four of the leading UK wireless providers
won licenses in the auction completed in February
2013. The block acquired by O2 requires that it provide
indoor coverage for at least 98% of the UK population
(including at least 95% of each to England, Northern
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales) by the end of 2017.
Telefónica-owned O2 and Vodafone launched their 800
MHz service in August 2013. By November 2013, EE
launched service in the 2.6 GHz band to supplement
its existing 1.8 GHz service. Finally, 3 UK launched
service using its 800 MHz license as well as service in
the 1.8 GHz spectrum it acquired from EE the previous
year. Thus, by the end of 2013, all of the leading UK
wireless providers were providing service in the bands
that the EU had allocated for LTE.
*  *  *
The UK was thus able to achieve fairly strong NGA 
coverage with roughly balanced contributions from VDSL
and DOCSIS 3 and without any meaningful contribution
from FTTP. BT remains committed to emphasizing VDSL
over FTTP, and the explosive growth of VDSL appears to
confirm the wisdom of this approach.
4.3.3 Germany
As a country with a low percentage of rural households,
high population density, and high per capita GDP,
Germany is a clear candidate for strong NGA cover-
age. German NGA coverage increased modestly from
64% to 66% from 2011 to 2012, rates that exceeded
the 48% and 54% benchmarks of the EU, but fell
short of the 73% and 82% benchmarks of the U.S. In
terms of rural coverage, NGA was available in 22% of
German households in 2011 and 26% of German
households in 2012. This was considerably higher
than the 9% and 12% levels in the EU, but fell below
the 38% and 48% levels in the U.S. LTE, which was
languishing at 22% in 2011, increased sharply to 52%
in 2012, which is above the 8% and 27% coverage
rates in the EU as a whole.
The primary driver of VDSL investments is facilities-
based competition from cable broadband. There are
some causes for concern, however. Investment per
household is well below EU averages, and bandwidth
usage per user is low. 
VDSL
VDSL represented a significant determinant of the high
levels of NGA coverage enjoyed by Germany. VDSL 
covered 41% of German households in 2011 and 46%
The UK was thus able to achieve fairly
strong NGA coverage with roughly 
balanced contributions from VDSL and
DOCSIS 3 and without any meaningful
contribution from FTTP. BT remains 
committed to emphasizing VDSL over
FTTP, and the explosive growth of VDSL
appears to confirm the wisdom of 
this approach.
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48 of German households in 2012. This was significantly
higher than the EU coverage rates of 19% and 25%. In
rural areas, VDSL coverage was 13% in 2011 and 22%
in 2012, both significantly higher than the EU rates of
3% and 5%. 
Begun as a government-owned monopoly, the German
telephone system was included as part of the
Deutsche Bundespost as the post-war successor to the
Reichspost. The 1989 postal reform separated it into a
separate entity (along with the Deutsche Post and the
Deutsche Postbank). In 1995, a subsequent round of
reform renamed the company Deutsche Telecom and
privatized it, although the German government still
owns 32% of the company (15% directly and 17%
through the government bank, KfW).
The German Federal Government adopted its
“Broadband Strategy Paper” in February 2009. It
includes two major objectives:  increasing coverage of
1 Mbps service from 92% to 100% by 2010 and
increasing 50 Mbps service from 20% to 75% by 2014.
Competition from cable broadband has forced tele-
phone companies to invest to upgrade their
networks. Vodafone deployed its VDSL network in the
summer of 2010, and in December 2012, Deutsche
Telecom announced that it is committing €6 billion to
deploy VDSL2 with vectoring over an FTTC architec-
ture, with plans to deliver vectored VDSL to 24 million
households (65% of the population) by 2016. The
German regulator approved vectoring in April 2013. In
May 2013, Telefónica and Deutsche Telecom signed
an agreement permitting Telefónica to use Deutsche
Telecom’s VDSL network.
The advent of vectoring and other technologies that
permit VDSL to deliver speeds in excess of 30 Mbps
are thus giving VDSL a more central role in delivering
high-speed broadband.
DOCSIS 3
DOCSIS 3 was the other major technology contribut-
ing to strong German NGA coverage. DOCSIS 3
reached 46% of German households in 2011 and
52% in 2012, well above EU coverage levels of 37%
and 39%, but behind U.S. coverage levels of 72% and
81%. DOCSIS 3 was substantially weaker in rural
areas, reaching only 4% of German households in
2011 and 6% in 2012, which was right in line with EU
benchmarks, but behind U.S. rural coverage of 37%
and 40%.
The German cable television industry began in 1970,
when a cooperative known as Senne TV began using
master antenna cable systems to engage in private
broadcasting, although the government fairly quickly
shut down that operation. In 1971, the Bundespost 
initiated trials in Nuremberg and Hamburg. A
December 1975 report issued by a blue-ribbon com-
mission endorsing cable and urging that it be a
federal monopoly was rejected by the government in
1977, which opted to authorize cable television only
where there was an “acute public demand.”
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Total Rural DOCSIS VDSL FTTP LTE Pct. DSL
NGA NGA 3 cable shared
Germany 66% 26% 52% 46% 3% 52% 47%
Europe 54% 12% 39% 25% 12% 27% 46%
U.S. 82% 48% 81% 10% 23% 86% n/a
Investment Price Avg. Bandwidth Rural Population GDP
per HH 12-30 speed per user HHs density per
Mbps Mbps capita
Germany $197 $19.12 6.0 14 11% 229 123
Europe $244 $27.64 5.7 18 15% 116 100
U.S. $562 $28.76 7.4 27 19% 34 152
49Eventually, the early prototype projects initiated dur-
ing this period became part of Deutsche Telecom.
Because the incumbent also owned cable system,
cable broadband deployed slowly until 1999, when
Deutsche Telecom spun off its cable assets into nine
operating companies. A series of consolidations left
the majority of the industry in the hands of two com-
panies:  Unity Media Kabel BW and Kabel
Deutschland, although Vodafone acquired Kabel
Deutschland in September 2013.
Cable modem service was introduced in 2003. By
2010, Kabel Deutschland had upgraded 85% of its
connections to DOCSIS 3. In Germany, cable broad-
band can reach only 75% of all households
nationwide, with the coverage being particularly low in
states such as Saxony-Anhalt and Thuringia.
Standard cable modem service is available in only
59% of German households and only 9% of German
rural households, and cable providers are focusing
their attention on upgrading their networks rather
than expanding their footprints. 
FTTP
FTTP has been slow to deploy in Germany, reaching
only 2.4% of households in 2011 and 2.6% of house-
holds in 2012. These coverage levels were far below
the EU-wide coverage rates of 10% in 2011 and 12%
in 2012 as well as the U.S. coverage rates of 17%
and 23%. Rural FTTP coverage was even lower at 0.4%
in 2011 and 0.7% in 2012.
As discussed in the section on VDSL, Germany has
chosen to deemphasize FTTP.  A 2011 study by
Wissenschaftlichen Institut für Infrastruktur und
Kommunikationsdienste (WIK) (Scientific Institute for
Infrastructure and Communication Services) con-
cluded that a nationwide FTTP rollout would cost
€70–€80 billion overall and €1000–€4000 per
household. Assuming a 70% penetration rate with an
average revenue per user (ARPU) of €38, only 25%–
45% of German households could be profitably
supplied with FTTP (WIK 2011). A subsequent study
commissioned by the German Bundesministerium für
Wirtschaft und Technologie (Federal Ministry of
Economics and Technology) similarly placed the costs
of a wide-area development of FTTP at €86–€94 bil-
lion (TÜV Rheinland 2013). 
For these reasons, Deutsche Telecom has chosen to
deemphasize FTTP.  In fact, it has made clear that it
would pursue the technology only in areas where 10%
of the households commit to adopting it. At the same
time, approximately twenty regional network opera-
tors, such as NetCologne and NetAachen, are also
making limited FTTB deployments in major metropoli-
tan areas. The German Bundeskartellamt (2010)
(German Federal Antitrust Agency) has taken steps to
facilitate the buildout of FTTP by clarifying that cooper-
ation in rural areas that currently lack broadband
service is unproblematic under the antitrust laws and
might be permissible in other areas if structured in a
way unlikely to harm competition. Deutsche Telecom
has indicated its willingness to cooperate with
NetCologne, 1&1 Internet, and Telefónica
Deutschland.
LTE
In terms of LTE, Germany represents a success story.
As of the end of 2011, national LTE coverage was
22% and rural LTE coverage was 33%, well above the
EU averages of 8% and 5%. By the end of 2012,
German national LTE coverage had soared to 52% and
rural LTE coverage had reached 50%, again well above
the EU averages of 27% and 10%.
One major reason for the robustness of Germany’s
LTE deployments is the fact that Germany completed
its 4G auctions relatively early. In May 2010, it com-
pleted its 4G auction, which included the 800 MHz
and 2.6 GHz auctions designed by the EU for LTE as
well as the 1.8 GHz and 2.0 GHz spectrum. 
The German licenses also included conditions that
helped speed the buildout of rural areas. Winners of
800 MHz licenses bore the obligation to focus on
rural areas. German communities were categorized by
number of inhabitants, with level one including towns
COUNTRY CASE STUDIES
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with fewer than five thousand inhabitants and level
four including cities with more than 50,000 inhabi-
tants. With each level, each state designated
communities that did not receive adequate broadband
services. Holders of 800 MHz licenses had to build
out 90% of the communities in each level before it
could proceed to the next level. The desire to serve
the largest metropolitan areas gave licensees strong
incentive to buildout rural areas.
Of the four leading German wireless companies,
Vodafone began providing LTE in September 2010, fol-
lowed by Deutsche Telecom in April 2011, O2 (owned
by Telefónica) in July 2011, and E-Plus (owned by KPN)
in March 2014. By the end of 2013, the main
providers served 180 to 200 German cities. O2 has
announced plans to acquire E-Plus, which would make
the merged company the largest wireless provider in
Germany and would likely accelerate upgrading E-
Plus’s network to LTE.
The future LTE market will be characterized by the
next-generation 4G technology known as LTE
Advanced, which is capable of providing download
speeds of 150 Mbps or even 300 Mbps. Deutsche
Telecom has announced plans to introduce LTE
Advanced by 2015/16, although Telefónica does not
plan to follow suit. Discussions have also begun
about reallocating the 700 MHz frequency band to
wireless broadband.
515. CONCLUSION
The increasing availability of high-quality data has the
promise to effect a sea change in broadband policy.
Debates that previously relied primarily on anecdotal
evidence and personal assertions of visions for the
future can increasingly take place on a firmer empiri-
cal footing.
In particular, these data can resolve the question
whether the U.S. is running behind Europe in the
broadband race or vice versa. The U.S. and European
mapping studies are clear and definitive:  These data
indicate that the U.S. is ahead of Europe in terms of
the availability of Next Generation Access (NGA) net-
works. The U.S. advantage is even starker in terms of
rural NGA coverage and with respect to key technolo-
gies such as FTTP and LTE.
Empirical analysis, both in terms of top-level statis-
tics and in terms of eight country case studies, also
sheds light into the key policy debate between facili-
ties-based competition and service-based competition.
The evidence again is fairly definitive, confirming that
facilities-based competition is more effective in terms
of driving broadband investment than service-based
competition. 
The empirical record also undercuts the position that
the provision of high-speed Internet depends on fiber.
In short, FTTP has remained a minor contributor to
NGA coverage, and those countries that emphasized
fiber represented the worst performers among the
eight European countries studied. Even Sweden, an
FTTP leader that is often lauded as a paragon of high-
speed broadband service, only achieved NGA
coverage of 57%, which is only slightly above the EU
average. The other countries that emphasized differ-
ent technologies or used a balanced approach
consistently achieved higher NGA coverage rates and
are placing increasing emphasis on VDSL, which will
play a particularly important role in rural areas. These
results suggest that broadband policy should not
focus on any particular technology as the definitive
solution. Instead, policymakers should recognize that
the viability of broadband technologies varies in
urban and rural areas. If so, policymakers would be
better served trying to promote a balanced approach
that accommodates multiple technologies.
Finally, LTE coverage depended on early deployment
of 2.6 GHz spectrum and a flexible approach to 1.8
GHz spectrum. Attempts to configure auctions to
stimulate competitors led to considerable delays in
deployment.
The empirical evidence produced by the mapping
studies thus indicates that the United States is faring
better than Europe in terms of broadband coverage
and provides a strong endorsement of the regulatory
approach taken by the U.S. These data stand as a
major landmark with which anyone asserting other-
wise must come to grips.
Despite the widespread availability, NGA adoption
continues to languish. Studies have consistently
shown that availability and cost are not the primary
barriers to NGA adoption, but rather that nonsub-
scribers do not see the need for the service. As a
result, ensuring that consumers enjoy the benefits
created by the broadband depends as much on
demand-side initiatives to encourage adoption, such
as those identified by the National Broadband Plan
and other similar documents, as it does on supply-
side initiatives to upgrade the infrastructure. 
The empirical record also undercuts the
position that the provision of high-speed
Internet depends on fiber. In short, FTTP
has remained a minor contributor to
NGA coverage, and those countries that
emphasized fiber represented the worst
performers among the eight European
countries studied.
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57About the Report 
Both the European Commission (EC) and the U.S. government have recently conducted or commissioned studies
providing detailed information about the extent of broadband coverage as of the end of 2011 and 2012. These stud-
ies report coverage levels for a wide range of speed tiers and technologies in both urban and rural areas. Although
the European mapping study focuses on Next Generation Access (NGA), which it defines to be service providing
download speeds of at least 30 Mbps, a close analysis reveals that the study actually reports data for 25 Mbps
service. Data from these studies served as the basis for analysis in this report. 
These mapping studies were supplemented by other studies conducted or commissioned by the EC or the Federal
Communications Commission that examine other key information, such as broadband investment, pricing, and 
download speeds. 
The author thanks Broadband for America for its financial support for the study.
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